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The aim of this research paper is to investigate the employment outcomes in South African 
manufacturing between 1972 and 2016. The research employs a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis in demonstrating how South Africa’s manufacturing sector has become 
increasingly capital-intensive, with aggregate manufacturing employment falling by 
approximately 600 thousand jobs between 1982 – 2016. The investigation highlights the 
influence of industrial policy decisions in this outcome, creating a bias towards investment in 
capital-intensive manufacturing industries. This trend has continued post-1994, despite 
government’s repeated commitment to job creation and strategic policy support for more 
labour-intensive industries.  
A further investigation of the manufacturing sector at a sub-industry level indicates that 
while capital-intensity has increased in capital and labour-intensive industries alike, the 
increase in aggregate manufacturing capital-intensity is due primarily to capital-intensive 
industries expanding their share of aggregate capital stock and output relative to labour-
intensive industries. Consequently, South Africa’s revealed comparative advantage lies, 
somewhat paradoxically, in capital-intensive production, contrasting the manufacturing sectors 
in similar comparator countries.  
To ensure a rigorous investigation of the aforementioned outcomes, the paper examines 
the common notion that South African real wages are too high to be competitive in labour-
intensive production. The findings indicate that poor labour productivity is an equally 
important contributor to uncompetitive unit labour costs relative to competitor countries.  
As a means of addressing these challenges, utilizing a practical example, the paper 
proposes the use of special economic zones to create an environment from which labour-
intensive production can thrive. It highlights the potential of targeted industrial policies, in a 
controlled environment to reduce the cost of labour whilst simultaneously improving 
productivity over time. Utilizing various instruments, for example wage subsidies, the example 
illustrates how such an approach is a cost-effective way of encouraging investment in labour-
intensive industries, simultaneously offering a solution to more meaningful employment 
creation in South African manufacturing.   
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INTRODUCTION 
High unemployment in South Africa remains a fundamental obstacle to economic 
transformation, poverty reduction and inclusive economic growth (Pollin, Epstein, Heintz, 
Ndikumana. [Pollin et al.] 2006.1-2). Over the past decade, unemployment in South Africa has 
risen reaching just under 28% by the end of 2018 (Quarterly Labour Force Survey [QLFS], 
2019). With 6.2 million people unemployed in South Africa at the start of 2019, as well as 
three consecutive years of negative per capita GDP growth, it’s clear that the country’s 
development trajectory must change to encompass more labour absorbing growth to combat 
the burden of high unemployment (The World Bank, 2017:53).  
In this regard, numerous development success stories talk to the job creation potential 
that a dynamic industrial base can generate, none more so than in East-Asia and in particular 
China (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2018). A robust manufacturing sector has long been 
recognized for its capacity to absorb surplus, often low and semi-skilled labour in an economy, 
concomitantly catalyzing growth and socio-economic development (The World Bank, 
2017:48-50). South Africa however, presents a different picture, one in which growth in the 
manufacturing sector has failed to translate into the transformational employment outcomes 
experienced in other developing economies.  
Figure 1.1 indicates that manufacturing’s contribution to formal private sector 
employment fell from roughly 17% in 1982 to little over 10% by 2016. In absolute terms, net 
formal manufacturing employment has declined significantly since at least 1981, falling from 
1.79 million to little over 1.2 million by 2016. In stark contrast, the manufacturing sectors in 





respectively to private sector employment in 2018 (International Labour Organization [ILO], 
2019). Moreover, in all of the aforementioned cases, manufacturing’s contribution to private 
sector employment was greater in 2018 than it was in 2008 (ILO, 2019). Over the same period, 
net employment in manufacturing grew globally by 30 million jobs, with notable 
manufacturing employment growth in China (5 million jobs), India (5 million jobs), Vietnam 
(2.5 million jobs), Mexico (2 million jobs) and Turkey (1 million jobs) (ILO, 2019).  
Although the trend of stuttering economic growth in South Africa partly explains the lack 
of employment growth in manufacturing (Black and Hasson, 2012:3; Chinembiri, 2010:5; 
Raubenheimer, 2015a), this has been exacerbated in both capital and labour-intensive 
industries alike, where advancements in technology, capital equipment and production 
processes have necessarily meant that less labour is required to produce rising levels of output 
(Pollin et al. 2006.10, ILO, 2016:9). However, these are not phenomena unique to South Africa 
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and yet the manufacturing sectors in other emerging market economies have nevertheless been 
able to achieve meaningful employment growth. It therefore stands to reason that in order to 
understand South Africa’s negative employment outcomes relative to its peers, one must 
explore the unique, idiosyncratic factors that have led to this divergence.  
An historic overview of industrial policy in South Africa is a logical place to start, as 
government policy has traditionally (pre-1994) supported and incentivized highly capital and 
energy-intensive manufacturing industries with limited job-creation potential (Black and 
Hasson, 2012:4). Post-1994, government support has remained heavily concentrated in 
industries that are highly-skill and capital-intensive, despite major industrial policy documents 
stating large-scale employment creation as the central objective (DTI, NIPF. 2007.18; DTI, 
IDAD. 2016:5). This bias in State support has fostered a path-dependence on capital-intensive 
industries for manufacturing growth, despite the most glaring economy-wide inefficiency 
being the current abundance of unemployed and unproductive low-skilled labour in the 
economy. (Black and Hasson, 2012:5). 
The effects of trade policy, in particular the liberalization thereof post-1994, must also 
be accounted for when assessing the poor employment outcomes in South African 
manufacturing (Chinembiri, 2010.1-7). Many of the light manufacturing industries, that have 
traditionally supported employment growth, have been the hardest hit by an exposure to 
increased global competition from low cost producers (Black and Hasson, 2012:6). Increased 
exposure to foreign competition, coupled with real wage growth in South African 
manufacturing that’s consistently outstripped growth in productivity, has contributed to a flurry 
of low-cost imports from foreign producers (Bhorat and Rooney, 2017:2; Edwards and Jenkins, 
2015:447; Edwards and Golub, 2004:2).  
The trend of increasing capital-intensity on the one hand and increased competition in 
labour-intensive manufacturing on the other, has resulted in a manufacturing sector that 
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paradoxically demonstrates a comparative advantage in capital-intensive manufacturing, 
despite the abundance of surplus low-skilled labour in the economy. Bearing in mind the 
severity of South Africa’s unemployment crisis, this trend must change if meaningful progress 
is to be made in combatting the socio-economic challenges plaguing the country at present. 
Thus, in order to transform the economy, industrial policy should be the fundamental stimulus 
to effectively utilize the endowment of low-skilled labour and discourage the overdependence 
on sub-optimal capital and energy-intensive production.  
By utilizing a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper seeks to 
examine the idiosyncratic factors that have led to the underwhelming employment outcomes 
in South African manufacturing. In doing so, the objective is to present a policy approach that 
may meaningfully combat these factors, such that South African manufacturing can better 
emulate the growth and employment outcomes experienced in the manufacturing sectors of 
other developing countries. To this end, the remainder of the paper is set out as follows: 
Section 1 explores in detail the evolution of South African manufacturing by examining 
the employment outcomes in the sector; the industrial policies that have (and continue to) shape 
the investment and growth outcomes in the sector; the evidence of increasing capital-intensity 
in the sector; and the impact of the deindustrialization phenomenon on South Africa as well as 
other emerging market economies. 
Section 2 examines the findings of the previous section from a sub-sectoral perspective, 
detailing the trends in growth, capital-intensity, employment, productivity and trade 
performance of various manufacturing sub-sectors in South Africa. The purpose is to establish 
the extent to which employment outcomes have been shaped by the expansion of capital-
intensive industries relative to labour-intensive industries, as well as the extent to which 
changes in factor-intensity within industries has driven aggregate manufacturing employment 
outcomes.  
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Section 3 examines the impact of international competition on the composition of South 
Africa’s manufacturing trade flows by detailing the exposure to foreign imports and dissecting 
the export performance of various manufacturing sub-sectors. The section then utilizes the 
revealed comparative advantage approach to compare and contrast South Africa’s comparative 
advantage with comparator countries.  
Section 4 debunks the popular notion that high wages are the sole reason for a lack of 
cost competitiveness in South African manufacturing. Using a sample of 21 comparator 
countries, this section uses various quantitative analyses to assess South African unit labour-
costs, labour-productivity and average real wages relative to the selected comparator countries 
in selected manufacturing industries.   
Finally, Section 5, on the basis of the findings in the preceding 4 sections, presents a 
practical strategic policy approach aimed at improving employment outcomes in South African 
manufacturing, with the use of labour-intensive special economic zones as the cornerstone of 




SECTION 1 – The Evolution of Employment Outcomes in the South African 
Manufacturing Sector 
 
This section explores various aspects of South African manufacturing that have contributed to 
the poor employment outcomes in the sector. As a first point of reference, the section will 
examine how over the past four decades manufacturing employment has decreased and capital-
intensity has increased. Thereafter, the section will detail the industrial policy decisions that 
have shaped the aforementioned outcomes, with further analyses exploring the implications for 
manufacturing productivity and trade.  
 
1.1 The Rise of Capital and Fall of Labour in South African 
Manufacturing 
It has long been recognized that growth in manufacturing is central to a country’s development, 
catalyzing economic growth and absorbing surplus lower-skilled labour in the economy. 
However, South African manufacturing has failed to deliver these developmental benefits, 
most notably from the standpoint of employment. In contrast to the steady decline in net 
manufacturing employment in the sector, capital investment has increased significantly. Table 
1.1a and 1.1b present data on the average annual compound growth rates of manufacturing real 
output; real capital stock and real capital stock per worker, as well as their respective absolute 




. As an additional point of reference, Figure 1.2 presents 
these changes as an index relative to their 1972 levels and includes a series for the aggregate 
capital-labour ratio (K/L) as well.  
 
 
1 All values expressed in 2010 constant prices.  
2 Peak employment in 1982.  
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 That South African manufacturing has been, and remains highly capital-intensive, at 
least in part accounts for the lack of employment growth in the sector (Black and Hasson, 
2012:4; Mohamed, 1997:1-7; Levy, 1992:3). The tables reveal that large-scale increases in 
manufacturing capital stock occurred between 1972 and 1980, where growth in aggregate 
manufacturing capital stock grew at an average rate of 8.1% per annum, with employment only 
growing at 2.8% per annum over the same period. While the rate of growth in manufacturing 
capital stock slowed from 1981 to 2010, it nevertheless continued to increase, while 





(1972-1980) (1981-1990) (1991-2000) (2001-2010) (2011-2016) 
Manufacturing Real Output 5.8% 0.8% 4.2% 2.4% -0.02% 
Manufacturing Capital Stock 8.1% 1.5% 2.0% 0.7% -1.8% 
Manufacturing Number of Employees 2.8% -0.2% -2.0% -1.0% -0.5% 
Capital Stock Per Employee 5.2% 1.8% 4.1% 1.7% -1.4% 
Employees (Per R1-million Output) -2.5% -0.9% -6.0% -3.3% -0.5% 




Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 




: Department of Trade and Industry. 




between capital investment and employment is usefully illustrated by the significant growth in 
the aggregate K/L ratio in South African manufacturing between 1980 and 2010 (see Figure 
1.2). 
The data presented in Tables 1.1a, 1.1b and Figure 1.2 support the views expressed by 
Levy (1992:13) and Black, Craig and Dunne [Black et al.] (2017) who note that industrial 
policy of the time supported capital deepening, rather than capital widening. Capital widening 
implies an expansion of production capacity in response to growing demand, with little or no 
change in the factor composition in production. In contrast, capital deepening instead focuses 
on increasing production capacity by substituting capital for labour inputs and thus increasing 
the K/L ratio (Tregenna, 2007:143). Implicitly, any growth in output would consequently 
require fewer employees in its production, with Table 1.1b exemplifying this by detailing the 
number of employees required to produce R1million of output in 1972 and 2016 respectively. 
In 1972 for every R1million of manufacturing output produced, just over 3 employees were 





Figure 1.2 Increasing Capital-intensity in South African Manufacturing 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry. 




: Department of Trade and Industry. 



































Employment Total Manufacturing Capital Stock Manufacturing Output Manufacturing Capital/Labour Ratio
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R1million of output produced. Table 1.1a indicates that this downward trend has been 
persistent, indicating that increases in manufacturing capacity and output since at least 1981 
can almost entirely be attributed to an aggregate net increase in capital stock, highlighting the 
structural shift toward an increasingly capital-dependent industrial growth path.  
 
1.2  The Evolution of Industrial Policy in South Africa 
The outcomes of the manufacturing sector in South Africa as described above are inextricably 
linked to the prevailing industrial policy of the day.  It is therefore imperative that any 
discussion of the sector’s evolution occur within this context. Furthermore, the South African 
economy is unique in that it is characterized by a distinct structural break in 1994, when the 
country emerged as a democracy after apartheid. Thus, it is critical to analyze the evolution of 
industrial policy in this light, given that strategies and the objectives underpinning various 
policy decisions differed significantly pre-and post-1994.  
 
1.2.1  Industrial Policy in South Africa Pre-1994 
Until the early 1970’s South African manufacturing grew rapidly under protective, apartheid-
era industrial and trade policy (Black et al., 2017:5). The establishment of the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) is a useful starting point when evaluating the policy decisions 
that underpinned this growth. Established in 1940, the function of the IDC was originally to 
provide broad-based support and financing to South Africa’s industrial and mining sectors. 
However, upon the formalization of apartheid in the 1950s, the IDC’s scope was redefined to 
promote strategic government objectives in targeted industries (Black and Hasson, 2012:2). 
One such objective was the expansion of large-scale, capital-intensive projects in the 
chemicals, energy and metals manufacturing industries. The size and scope of these projects 
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were considered too large to be undertaken by the private sector alone, warranting significant 
support from the IDC and other State financing mechanisms, giving rise to state-funded mega-
projects such as Foskor and Sasol (Fotoyi, Tetani, Tsedu and Wood [Fotoyi et al.] 2016:10; 
Mohamed, 1997:2-7; Black and Hasson, 2012:9).  
Another notable feature of South Africa’s industrial development pre-1994 was the 
dominance of capital and energy-intensive industries and associated interests, centered around 
the country’s vast endowment of natural resources, most notably precious metals, iron ore and 
coal. This has since been referred to as the mineral-energy-complex (MEC) (Fotoyi et al. 
2016:9; Mohamed, 1997:6; Black et al., 2017:21; Black and Hasson, 2012:4). Underpinning 
the MEC, the 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by the rapid expansion of cheap, coal-
based electricity, punctuated by significant investment in the parastatal Eskom (Black and 
Hasson, 2012:9-10; Mohamed, 1997:4-6).  This expansion in electricity capacity enabled the 
government to set extremely low tariffs in order to attract large-scale investment in industries 
that were both heavily reliant on energy, and capital and resource-intensive (Black and Hasson, 
2012:9; Mohammed, 1997:6).  
While significant direct and indirect State support in cheap electricity sought to 
encourage investment in capital and energy-intensive sectors such as mining and various 
immediate downstream manufacturing industries (Mohammed, 1997:5-6), these investment 
flows were further catalyzed by policy distortions in factor markets, designed to reduce the 
user cost of capital (UCC) and implicitly reducing the cost of capital relative to labour. For 
example, South Africa experienced low (and even negative) interest rates pre-1994, epitomised 
by the low-interest rate loans offered to investors by the IDC. In addition, various taxation 
policies further reduced the UCC by allowing capital-expenditure to be deducted from taxable 
income, while exemption from General Sales Taxes on capital goods; ‘skewed’ depreciation 
rules; investment allowances; payroll levies and registration fees created further distortions in 
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capital markets (Black and Hasson, 2012:9; Fotoyi et al. 2016:9; Samson, Quene, van Niekerk 
[Samson et al.] 2001:7). In 1981, further to the effects of these policies, the formal recognition 
of non-racial trade unions led to rapid unionisation and mass strike action, which meant that 
the cost – and risk – of labour, relative to capital further increased (Bhorat, Naidoo and Yu, 
2014:4; Samson et al, 2001:7-8).  
 Not only was policy heavily biased towards capital-intensive production, but it was 
inherently inward-oriented and embedded within theories of import-substituting 
industrialization (ISI) (Fotoyi et al, 2016.10; Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:7; Thurlow, 
2006:2). Manufacturing exports accounted for a little over 9% of total manufacturing output in 
1971, with negligible increases in this figure by 1988 (Levy, 1992:8).  High trade barriers, most 
notably in the form of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and import tariffs, sought to nurture 
domestic industries, with growth in output primarily driven by the substitution of imports for 
domestically produced products (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:3). On the one hand, this gave 
rise to non-traditional manufacturing industries such as motor vehicles, that were able to supply 
the domestic market with little or no competition from foreign producers (Fotoyi et al. 2016:9). 
On the other hand, the inward-orientated nature of the South African economy to some extent 
inhibited the development of various industries that were relatively labour-intensive. For 
example, the lack of competition from imported product substitutes meant that large upstream 
producers of steel and chemicals could utilize import parity pricing for key inputs in the 
production of various light-manufactured metal and plastic products. The net effect was 
increased production costs in more labour-intensive downstream industries such as the plastics 
industry (Black et al., 2017:21; Green, 2009:2).  
By the early 1980s anti-export bias had waned as it became apparent that ISI-based 
strategies were no longer sufficient to catalyze further dynamism in the South African economy 
(Black and Hasson, 2012: Black et al., 2017:5; Edwards and Lawrence,2006:4; Levy,1992:10). 
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The relatively small size of the South African market meant that there were limited 
opportunities for further growth, while the outward-oriented development success stories 
unfolding in East Asia boosted the sentiment that manufactured exports could deliver the 
required growth impetus the economy needed (Lin and Chang, 2009:6). Moreover, the country 
had become increasingly dependent on gold exports as a source of foreign exchange earnings, 
but these were no longer sufficient to service the growing capital account deficit derived from 
significant State borrowing for energy mega-projects such as Sasol in the 1970s, as well as 
globally induced sanctions placed on South Africa in the 1980’s (Mohamed, 1997:11; Edwards 
and Lawrence, 2006:4).  
Consequently, by the mid-1980s the government began to remove import controls such 
as QRs, and new measures such as the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) were 
introduced (DTI, 2013:190; Jonsson and Submaranian, 2001:200). However, as noted by Levy 
(1992:10), the economy remained relatively protected during this time, despite government’s 
stated commitment to the removal of QRs. For example, while QRs were reduced, this 
reduction coincided with other import tariff increases, including the use of aggressive import 
reference prices with the magnitude of protection dependent on the difference between the 
reference price and the import price. As such the South African economy remained highly 
protected and interventionist up to 1994 (Levy, 1992:11-12; Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:3).  
 
1.2.2  Industrial Policy in South Africa Post-1994 
When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, the manufacturing sector remained protected 
and relatively uncompetitive, dominated by several highly capital-intensive industries and 
concentrated amongst relatively few large firms (Black and Roberts, 2009:211). The World 
Bank argued that the South African economy was fundamentally distorted, citing a 
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combination of low real interest rates, distortions in factor markets and a bias in State support 
for capital-intensive production as the primary contributors to slow growth and high 
unemployment in the economy (Black et al., 2017:5; Black and Roberts, 2009:211). Very much 
in line with the neo-liberal ‘consensus’ emerging at the time, the World Bank prescribed broad 
liberalization policies, including a significant reduction in barriers to trade. In line with this 
prescription, the newly elected ANC-led government adopted the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy in 1996, encompassing reform in trade, monetary, fiscal and 
industrial policy (Mkhize, 2015:6-7; Thurlow, 2006:1). The strategy placed an emphasis on 
exports and international competitiveness, with the manufacturing sector identified as critical 
in combatting slow growth and high levels of unemployment (Edwards and Behar, 2005:1; 
Thurlow, 2006:1-4).  
Trade liberalization was a central feature of GEAR and post-1994 industrial policy (DTI, 
2007:10).  This gave rise to the removal of the remaining QRs, the simplification of the import 
tariff structure and a pronounced reduction in average tariffs on manufactured goods (Black 
and Roberts, 2009:214; Black and Hasson, 2012:5; Black et al., 2017:6; Edwards and Behar, 
2005:2; Fotoyi et al. 2016:11; Jonsson and Subramanian, 2001: 201). As a consequence, the 
level of protection in the manufacturing sector reduced significantly – the average tariffs on 
manufactured goods declined from 35% in 1984 to 12.9% in 2000, and only 9.5% by 2006 
(Black et al., 2017:6; Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:43). The impact of tariff reductions on 
imports is clear, but the effect on exports is equally significant (Edwards and Lawrence, 
2006:6). Given that firms often require imports as inputs in the production process, a tax on 
these imports essentially acts as a tax on exports as the cost of production in increased. Thus, 
the reduction in tariffs was seen as critical to the government’s export-oriented strategy, as this 
reduction would translate into lower unit costs for domestic producers and enhanced 
international competitiveness (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:7).  
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Several other government policies sought to complement trade liberalization, many of 
which were supply-side interventions concerned with improving productivity and expediting 
the move into higher-value added activities (Nattrass and Seekings, 2007:7), as well as 
promoting growth in non-traditional exports (DTI, 2007:10-11).  A critical concern in this 
regard was the lack of diversification in South Africa’s export profile, with resource and 
energy-intensive manufacturers still constituting the majority of total manufactured exports 
(Ashman and Newman, 2009:1-2; Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:7-8; Fotoyi et al. 2016:12). 
Subsequently, the Motor Industry Development Program (MIDP) was implemented in 1995 as 
a means of boosting growth in output and exports of motor vehicles and associated industries 
(Black et al., 2017:6; Black and Hasson, 2012:6; DTI, 2007:10-11; Edwards, Rankin, Schoer 
[Edwards et al.] 2008:5). Additionally, efforts were made to enhance the knowledge, 
technology and skills-intensity of production and exports (DTI, 2007:10).  To this end, the 
government introduced the National Research and Development Strategy; the Integrated 
Manufacturing Strategy; and the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Strategy as a means of 
delivering on these objectives (Black et al., 2017:7; Black and Hasson, 2012:5; Black and 
Roberts, 2009:214).  
However, despite this broad array of policy interventions, the net impact remained 
limited (Black et al, 2017:8). While the interventions described above were aimed at widening 
the scope of State support by promoting non-traditional exports and ensuring more labour 
absorbing growth, the reality was that significant support remained focused in capital and 
energy-intensive industries (Black and Roberts, 2009:215; Black and Hasson, 2012:6). 
Consequently, while non-traditional exports had grown, much of this growth could be 
accounted for by industries with low job-creating potential such as the relatively capital-
intensive motor vehicle industry (Black et al., 2017:7; Ashman and Newman, 2009; Fotoyi et 
al. 2016:11). Moreover, despite a commitment from the IDC to further promote labour-
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intensive industries, a large proportion of funding remains weighted heavily in favour of capital 
and energy-intensive industries (Black et al., 2017:7; Black and Hasson, 2012:15-16; Black 
and Roberts, 2009:215).  
Epitomising the outward-oriented industrial policy post-1994 was the implementation of 
the Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) policy framework in 1997 and later, the revised Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) policy framework in 2014, established to encourage investment in 
export and employment-intensive industries (Chinguno, 2011:2). However, the IDZ program 
was flawed and struggled to attract the investment required to replicate the success of similar 
industrial zone programs in East Asia (Chinguno, 2011:2-3; Asian Development Bank; 
2015:64-68). Furthermore, despite job-creation consistently cited as a central objective of 
South Africa’s current SEZ program (DTI, 2019), there has been no clear intention shown to 
target investors from industries that offer the greatest job-creation potential. Consequently, 
investment in South Africa’s SEZs has to a large extent reflected the capital-intensive 
investment patterns highlighted above
3
 (South African Industrial Development Zone Survey 
[SAIDZ], 2015; East London Development Zone Survey [ELIDZ], 2015; (Black and Hasson, 
2012:15).  
1.3 Inefficiency of Investment in South African Manufacturing 
Although capital investment in manufacturing has been significant since 1972, it hasn’t been 
deployed with any great efficiency. Consider Table 1.2 which details the compound annual 
growth rates of capital productivity (CP), labour productivity (LP) and total-factor productivity 
(TFP) in South African manufacturing between 1972 and 2016. Additionally, the table displays 
the average incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) over this period. The data reveals an 
 
3
Both the IDZ and SEZ policies are explored in greater detail in Section 5 of this study.   
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average reduction in CP between 1972 and 2000.  Between 1972 and 1980, CP fell by 2.7% 
per annum, falling again by 1.1% per annum between 1981 and 1990, and by 0.2% per annum 
between 1991 and 2000.  Levy (1992:3) notes similar declines in CP between 1971 and 1988, 
citing annual CP declines of 2.8% per annum.  
The fall in CP is indicative of inefficiencies in investment decisions, many of which were made 
by government under the ambitious expansion of Eskom and the previously State-owned Sasol. 
Nonetheless, it’s clear from Table 1.2 that investment consistently flowed to activities that 
were already under-utilizing their production capacity. Indicative of this, is the fact that the 
sector was able to significantly increase its output between 1997 and 2008 (see Figure 1.2), 
without the proportionate increased investment in factor inputs, resulting in an improvement 
in TFP over this period.  The marginal gains in CP between 2001 and 2010 reflect as much, 
with CP increasing by 1.7% per annum. In contrast to CP, there have been notable gains in the 
LP of South African manufacturing as noted by Rankin (2016:6-7).  Table 1.2 indicates that 
LP changes have remained positive on average since 1972, with the average CAGR of LP 




(1972-1980) (1981-1990) (1991-2000) (2001-2010) (2011-2016) 
Average ICOR 4.9 15.3 16.3 11.0 20.5 
Capital Productivity -2.7 -1.1 -0.2 1.7 1.4 
Labour Productivity 1.9 0.1 3.2 3.8 0.9 
Total-Factor Productivity -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 2.7 1.9 
Table 1.2 South Africa’s Compound Annual Growth Rate - Manufacturing Productivity and ICOR 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
*Author’s own calculations. 
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occurring over the same period.  Similar views are expressed by Levy (1992:5) and the DTI 
(2011), where it is noted that much of the gains in LP have been driven by increasingly 
capital-dependent production activities.  
The implication of an increase in capital inputs is that fewer (or the same number of) 
workers are required to produce the same (or higher) levels of output. Indeed, as Figure 1.3 
below illustrates, this has undoubtedly been the case. The figure presents manufacturing 
employment on the left-hand axis, while manufacturing value-added is presented on the right-
hand axis.  From as early as 1981, manufacturing employment was already in significant 
decline, while manufacturing value-added had continued to increase, implying a reduction in 
labour’s contribution to manufacturing value-added.  
The gains in LP can also be explained by the composition of production in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. As capital-intensive industries in the manufacturing sector 
necessarily require less labour per unit of output produced, labour will inherently be more  
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productive in these industries. Thus, if capital-intensive industries expand their contribution to 
aggregate output relative to more labour-intensive industries, aggregate manufacturing LP 
must, by definition, increase as well (and vice versa) (Rankin, 2018; Rankin, 2016). 
These compositional changes in the production structure (i.e. the capital-labour ratio) 
occur within individual industries as well. This can usefully be explained within the context of 
improved levels of technology encompassing the production process. As the level of 
technology in capital inputs increases, the number of employees required to produce the same 
level of output is reduced (Lawrence, 2018:2-3. This effect is evident in labour and capital-
intensive industries alike, albeit to varying degrees. Thus, not only are capital-intensive 
industries becoming less labour-demanding but labour-intensive industries themselves may 
also be less labour-demanding (Lawrence, 2018:3).  
Jonsson and Subramanian (2001:208) offer a different explanation for the rises in LP. 
The authors argue that much of the aforementioned gains in LP have been derived from trade 
liberalization, occurring from as early as the 1990s, rather than capital inputs. This view is 
supported by Edwards and Golub (2004:16); Edwards and Jenkins (2015:456-460), Edwards 
and Behar (2005:2-3); and Rankin (2016). To some extent Table 1.2 affirms these views, citing 
average gains in LP of 3.8% per annum between 2001 and 2010, a period characterized by an 
increasingly outward-oriented focus.  In the presence of increased global competition, firms 
have been forced to streamline operations in order to become (or remain) competitive in local 
as well as global markets, whilst firms unable to do so have invariably exited the market (Black 
and Hasson, 2012:6). The exit of less productive firms in the face of foreign competition is 
likely to further account for the observed aggregate productivity gains in the sector.  
While the period between 1972 and 2000 was characterized by large gains in LP, they 
were not large enough to offset the declines in CP and consequently, TFP declined over the 
same period. Given that TFP is calculated using a weighted average of the relative factor 
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endowments in the production process (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2011:33), the 
declining labour-intensity in the economy ensured that LP gains were not enough to improve 
overall efficiency. These results are reaffirmed by Edwards and Golub (2004:12-13), who note 
that aggregate changes in TFP in South African manufacturing have generally lagged 
comparator economies since the 1970’s.  
The lack of TFP gains in South African manufacturing can be better understood in terms 
of the ICOR presented in Table 1.2, which is calculated as the ratio of incremental increases in 
investment divided by incremental increases in output.  The ICOR is useful in this regard as it 
sheds light on the extent to which investments are being used efficiently, with an increase in 
the ICOR revealing some combination of lower productivity and increased capital intensity 
(Taguchi and Lowachai, 2015:1-2).  Thus, an increase in a country’s ICOR over time implies 
that capital investments are deployed inefficiently on a consistent basis, while a decrease in 
ICOR signifies an improvement in the allocative efficiency of capital investment (Taguchi and 
Lowachai, 2015:3-5).  Table 1.2 reveals that the ICOR in South African manufacturing 
increased significantly between 1972 and 2000 from nearly 5:1 to over 16:1. Levy (1992:6) 
notes that the ICOR of South African manufacturing was significantly higher than Taiwan, 
Korea, Malaysia and Mexico over the same period, highlighting the indiscriminate and 
ineffectual increase in capital investment occurring in South African manufacturing relative to 
output.  Despite a decline in the ICOR between 2001 and 2010, characterizing a period of 
strong output growth and more productive capital utilization, the ICOR still remains at high 
levels in South Africa.  
 
1.4 Increased Exports  
As previously discussed, trade liberalization has been a central feature of industrial policy since 
1994, heralding a new period of increased globalization of the South African economy. Figure 
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1.4 presents data on South African manufactured exports and imports on the left-hand axis (R-
billion 2010 constant prices), while the right-hand axis presents exports as a percentage of total 
output, and imports as a percentage of total domestic demand.  
Figure 1.4 highlights the impact of trade liberalization on the trade of manufactured 
goods. Between 1971 and 1991, the trade of manufactured goods (both exports and imports) 
was stagnant highlighting the inward-orientation of the economy under the apartheid 
government. By 1991, the real import value of manufactured goods was roughly similar to 
1971 levels, with imports of manufactured goods constituting only 16.8% of total domestic 
demand. Similarly, growth in the real value of exports between 1971 and 1991 was negligible, 
with only 11.5% of total manufactured output in 1991 destined for the export market. Between 
1994 and 2016, the real value of manufactured imports more than doubled, growing at a  
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compound rate of 3.9% per annum, with manufactured imports constituting approximately 
40% of domestic demand by 2016.  Similarly, manufactured exports grew at a compound rate 
of 6.9% per annum between 1994 and 2016, with export value more than three times 1994 
levels by 2016, constituting 35% of total manufactured output produced.  
However, in the context of declining employment in South African manufacturing, the 
export boom occurring since 1994 has failed to deliver the required impetus on job creation. 
As noted by Black et al (2017:1), manufactured exports are even more capital-intensive than 
aggregate manufacturing output, while Bell and Cattaneo (1997) note that imports are 
relatively labour-intensive. The implications for job creation in South Africa are equally 
concerning when one considers the positive employment and growth outcomes that countries 
such as China and other East Asian nations have been able to achieve on the back of rapid 
export growth (Asian Development Bank, 2015:87-89). 
In addition to the composition of import and exports, Figure 1.5 reveals that South 
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African manufactured exports have not grown as fast as various comparator countries.  The 
figure displays, as an index, the growth of nominal dollar value manufactured exports of Brazil, 
India, Turkey, Mexico and South Africa between 1984 and 2016. Figure 1.5 reveals that 
growth in South African manufactured exports has significantly underperformed three of the 
four comparator countries, with only Brazil achieving slower export growth. Implicitly, the 
employment benefits that have accrued from the rapid export-oriented growth in East-Asia 
seem not to be materializing in the South African case.  
 
1.5  Deindustrialization in South Africa 
Consider the data provided in Figure 1.6 below, which displays the share of manufacturing 
value-added in GDP and manufacturing employment as a share of total private sector 
employment between 1971 and 2016.  Figure 1.6 indicates that South African manufacturing’s 
relative contribution to GDP has consistently declined since the early 1990s.  After a period of 
strong industrial-based growth in the 1970s, manufacturing’s share of GDP has fallen from 
roughly 19% in 1981 to 13.8% in 2016, declining at an average compound rate of 0.8% per 
annum, this despite the considerable policy assistance targeted at growing South Africa’s 
industrial base.  
Table 1.3 provides a comparative context for this outcome, displaying the manufacturing 
share of GDP for 5 emerging market (EM) economies in 2000 and 2016 namely: Brazil; China; 
India; Mexico and Turkey. Table 1.3 reveals that the process of deindustrialization is not 
unique to South Africa.  In fact, manufacturinges share of GDP has declined in all 5 comparator 
countries since at least 2000.  However, what is unique in the South African experience, is the 
pace at which this apparent trend of deindustrialization has occurred. For example, between 
2000 and 2016, manufacturing’s contribution to GDP in South Africa declined by a total of 
31%.  Although all five comparator countries demonstrated similar declines in manufacturing’s 
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contribution to GDP over the same period, these declines were less significant (Brazil: 22%; 
























Share of GDP  Share of Total Private Sector Employment
Figure 1.6 SA Manufacturing Share of GDP & Private Sector Employment 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank; Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 






Manufacturing Share of GDP (%) 
Country Brazil China India Mexico Turkey 
South  
Africa 
Manufacturing Share of GDP 
(2000) 
13.1% 37.0% 16.5% 19.0% 18.8% 18.5% 
Manufacturing Share of GDP 
(2016) 
10.3% 28.8% 15.3% 16.8% 16.6% 13.8% 
Percentage Change 
(2000-2016) 
-22% -22% -8% -12% -11% -31% 
Table 1.3 Manufacturing Share of GDP in South Africa and Comparator Countries 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank; Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
*Authors own calculations. 
 
 32 
In the South African case, where real GDP growth has been less than 3% since 2011, and 
only 0.6% in 2016, a declining share of manufacturing in GDP is clearly indicative of the poor 
growth performance of South African manufacturing in general.  This is confirmed when 
considering the data presented in Table 1.4 below. Since 2004, South Africa has consistently 
underperformed in terms of manufacturing growth relative to China, India, Mexico and Turkey, 
with only Brazil posting an equally poor growth performance in the sector. In the context of an 
increasingly open and competitive global economy, an apparent lack of competitiveness in the 
South African manufacturing sector has been exposed, resulting in slow growth in exports, and 
greater import competition from foreign producers (Raubenheimer, 2015; Edwards and 
Jenkins, 2015:447-449; Edwards and Bahar, 2005:2-3). 
 
 
1.6  Conclusion 
Section 1 has detailed the rapid expansion in aggregate capital-intensity in South African 
manufacturing on the one hand with a concomitant decline in manufacturing employment on 
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the other, reviewing the period 1972 to 2016.  These outcomes have undoubtedly been shaped 
by numerous industrial policy decisions that sought to encourage large-scale capital investment 
by reducing the UCC. Moreover, where job creation has been a stated intention of industrial 
policy – most notably post-1994 – these policies have lacked the nous to provide any 
meaningful impetus to job-creation. Thus, while the sector achieved modest manufacturing 
growth between 1997 and 2008, much of this has proven to be not only jobless growth, but 
also job-shedding growth, as the sector now employs fewer people than it did in 2008 (Nattrass 
and Seekings, 2019; Edwards and Behar, 2005:16).  
The pace at which growth in manufacturing capital stock has outstripped employment 
has had detrimental effects for overall efficiency, despite the apparent (and expected) LP gains. 
Capital investment has consistently failed to deliver any meaningful productivity gains, with 
negative productivity gains recorded over various periods in the fast four decades. The gains 
in LP have not been great enough to offset this, resulting in meagre TFP gains over the same 
period. Moreover, if one considers the millions of South Africans currently unemployed and 
unproductive, the continued investment in capital-intensive industries where job-creation 
potential is limited this has had tremendously adverse effects on economy-wide productivity 
as well (Black et al., 2017:12).  
South Africa’s export performance has done little to alleviate the unemployment crisis, 
with significant growth in manufactured exports since 1994 not delivering the expected 
impetus for job creation. Over the same period, manufacturing growth failed to keep pace with 
the rest of the South African economy, reflecting a trend of deindustrialization and a falling 
share of manufacturing in GDP.  This trend has accelerated in wake of the 2008 financial crisis, 
as South African manufacturing continues to underperform relative to other comparable 
economies in a competitive and globalized market. The slowdown in manufacturing growth 
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has further compounded its already underwhelming contribution to private sector employment, 
punctuating the sector’s failure to deliver meaningful job-creation in South Africa.   
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SECTION 2 – A Sub-Sectoral Analysis of South African Manufacturing 
 
To fully account for the trends in the South African manufacturing sector in aggregate and the 
impact of these on employment levels, it is necessary to analyze manufacturing at a sub-
sectoral level
4
.  This allows for differentiation between changes in sub-sectoral factor-intensity 
in production, or sectoral changes in the composition of aggregate production. 
Two important questions must be answered in this regard. Firstly, has the increased 
aggregate capital-intensity in manufacturing been driven by sub-sectors becoming relatively 
more capital-intensive in general, or has this been driven by a shift in the distribution of 
aggregate output to capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive sub-sectors?  And secondly, 
has increased capital investment made sub-sectors relatively more or relatively less productive?  
This analysis is critical not only to answer these questions, but to provide clarity on how 
investment and growth in various manufacturing sub-industries demands a simultaneous 
increase in employment, thus highlighting the industries with the greatest job-creation 
potential.  
This paper defines sub-sectors as either ultra-capital-intensive (UCI); capital intensive 
(CI); intermediate-capital-intensive (ICI); labour-intensive (LI) and ultra-labour-intensive 
(ULI).  A similar classification approach has been used by (Black et al., 2017) and Bell and 
Cattaneo (1993).  This classification differs in that it adds an additional category, namely UCI.  




4 For ease of reference, the analysis will consistently classify sub-sectors according to their factor-intensity 
using the respective capital-labour ratios in 2016. This classification will be used throughout the remainder of 







2.1  Sub-Sectoral Composition and Production Output 
Table 2.2 below presents each sub-sector’s shares of real output, employment and real capital 
stock in South African manufacturing between 1972 and 2016, while Table 2.3 presents each 
sub-sector’s average annual growth rates of real output, real capital stock, and share of 
employment between 1972 and 1994, and between 1995 and 2016 respectively.  In addition, 
Table 2.3 presents the compound average annual growth rates of the K/L ratio in each sector.  
By analyzing changes in the sectoral composition of South African manufacturing in 
Table 2.2, one can determine the extent to which the overall growth in capital-intensity is 
derived from changes in each sub-sector’s relative share of total output.  Similarly, an analysis 
of the sub-sectoral growth rates in Table 2.3 reveals the extent to which these changes are 
derived from a contraction in labour-intensive sub-sectors or the relative expansion of capital-
intensive sub-sectors.  Furthermore, the analysis of the capital-labour ratios in Table 2.3 sheds 
light on the extent to which the growing capital-intensity in South African manufacturing has 
been driven by changes in factor-intensity within different sub-sectors. Once again, these 
changes will be referred to in relation to events pre and post-1994.  
Table 2.2 confirms the rising capital-intensity in production that was cited in Section 1.1 
above.  In 1972, Ultra-Capital Intensive (UCI) and Capital Intensive (CI) industries accounted 
for a combined share of 43% of total real output, increasing to 55% by 2016.  In contrast, 
Labour Intensive (LI) and Ultra-Labour Intensive (ULI) industries saw a decline in their 
combined share, accounting for roughly 32% in 1972 and only 22% by 2016. The share of total 
output in ICI industries also declined from 25% in 1972 to 22% in 2016. A notable feature of 
the continued dominance of capital-intensive production in the manufacturing sector is the 




Table 2.2 Share of Real Output, Capital Stock & Employment by Industry 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 




MEC (mineral-energy-complex) referred to in Section 1.2.2 For example, the largest relative 
growth has been in the coke and other petroleum products sub-sector, increasing its share of 
total output by 4.8 percentage points (PPs), followed by other chemicals (4.1 PPs); basic iron 
and steel (2.78 PPs) and basic chemicals (1.8 PPs). At the same time, relatively labour-
intensive industries have seen their share of total output decline, exemplified by declines in the 
share of total output from the metal products (5 PPs); machinery (3.7 PPs) and textiles 
 
 Average Annual Growth Rates (%) 
 
(1972 - 1994) (1995 – 2016) 
Output Invest. Emp. K/L Output Invest. Emp. K/L 
Other Chemicals  5.4 3.5 2.4 -0.0 4.4 4.1 2.2 2.0 
Basic Chemicals  4.4 5.8 2.3 3.2 4.0 1.9 -1.7 3.7 
Beverages  5.6 6.3 2.0 4.0 1.2 -0.02 -1.2 -1.0 
Coke & Petroleum Products  7.9 12.4 2.5 9.4 5.0 -0.9 2.7 -2.9 
Non-Ferrous Metals  5.5 7.3 1.0 4.7 4.0 -0.01 -2.0 1.1 
Motor Vehicles 2.6 3.3 0.1 2.9 4.7 3.1 -0.8 4.3 
Basic Iron & Steel  4.1 6.5 -0.4 3.2 5.4 -3.2 -2.5 -1.0 
Tobacco  3.5 1.36 -0.3 2.8 0.9 -7.4 0.01 -7.2 
Glass  2.8 3.9 0.9 3.0 1.3 3.0 -2.6 5.0 
Paper & Paper Products  3.9 3.8 1.8 1.4 2.7 1.3 0.4 0.8 
Non-Metallic Minerals  1.1 2.1 -0.1 0.5 1.5 0.7 -3.3 4.8 
Food  3.3 3.6 1.3 1.7 2.7 1.8 -0.5 2.0 
Other Transport Equipment  -2.0 1.1 -2.6 3.2 5.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Other Manufacturing  5.3 3.0 1.9 0.1 1.3 5.0 -2.6 6.7 
Rubber  3.1 1.5 0.2 1.3 1.9 -0.1 -2.5 2.8 
Printing & Publishing  3.2 1.2 2.2 -1.5 1.5 2.9 0.2 2.0 
Machinery  0.9 1.5 0.3 1.6 2.8 2.6 1.0 2.2 
Metal Products  0.9 2.6 0.7 1.3 2.3 -2.2 -0.9 -1.9 
Electrical Machinery  4.2 2.0 2.7 -0.8 3.3 -0.02 -0.01 0.1 
Plastics  7.3 5.3 4.7 -0.1 0.6 0.2 -0.1 0.5 
Professional & Sci. Equipment  5.5 2.2 3.3 -0.3 3.6 3.4 0.7 3.2 
TV, Radio & Comm. Equipment  5.0 1.3 4.3 -2.9 2.1 -1.8 -1.6 -0.1 
Textiles  1.2 -1.1 -1.4 0.3 1.3 -2.5 -3.0 -0.5 
Wood  2.7 0.8 1.6 -1.1 3.5 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 
Clothing  4.1 -0.8 1.6 -3.4 0.7 -2.5 -3.1 0.3 
Leather & Leather Products  3.4 2.6 0.6 1.6 3.8 0.6 -1.8 2.7 
Footwear  2.3 1.4 0.6 0.9 0.8 -1.6 -4.8 3.5 
Furniture  4.5 2.6 2.7 -0.5 1.8 1.0 -2.2 2.9 
Table 2.3 Average Annual Growth Rates of Output, Investment, Employment & Capital/Labour Ratios 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
*Authors own calculations 
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industries (1.7 PPs).  As the structure of aggregate production in the sector has increasingly 
shifted to relatively capital-intensive industries, this has inevitably resulted in a change in 
aggregate demand for capital relative to labour, at least in part accounting for the large 
divergence between capital stock and employment in the manufacturing sector as demonstrated 
in Section 1.1.  
Interestingly, Table 2.2 reveals that since 2006, the UCI and CI industries have 
experienced a decline in their respective shares of aggregate real output in the sector, while the 
ICI and LI industries have expanded their shares of real output.  This indicates that aggregate 
production has become slightly more labour-intensive since 2006, further evidenced by the 
falling aggregate capital-labour ratio (K/L) since 2012.  Nonetheless, aggregate production is 
still heavily concentrated in industries that have demonstrated very weak employment 
generating potential.  This point is further highlighted below, where the distribution of 
investment and employment in the manufacturing sector is considered.  
 
2.2  Composition of Sub-Sectoral Capital Stock and Employment 
Given the growth of real output in UCI and CI industries relative to LI and ULI industries, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that a similar picture emerges when analyzing the distribution of capital 
stock between the different sub-sectors.  In 1972, the share of capital stock was heavily 
concentrated in the UCI and CI industries, accounting for a combined share of 58.6% of 
aggregate manufacturing capital stock. In contrast, LI and ULI industries accounted for only 
24% of total capital stock, while ICI industries accounted for 17.5%. By 2016, investment was 
even more heavily concentrated in capital-intensive industries, where the share of capital stock 
in UCI and CI industries reached 73% by 2016.  Even if aggregate production was distributed 
evenly amongst all industries in the sector, one would expect that UCI and CI industries would 
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nevertheless still command a greater share of total capital stock, simply because more capital 
is required in the production of one unit of output.  Thus, it is expected that the share of capital 
stock in these industries would have increased as well.   
Similarly, the large share of total employment in LI and ULI industries relative to their 
shares of overall production is equally unsurprising. However, what is alarming is that the 
industries that have received the largest share of capital-investment, namely UCI and CI 
industries, have failed to deliver any meaningful employment growth in the sector. For 
example, industries such as coke and petroleum; motor vehicles; non-ferrous metals and basic 
chemicals (all either CI or UCI industries) have all increased their share of capital stock 
significantly since 1972, but with next to no improvement in their respective shares of 
aggregate manufacturing employment.  It is important to note that in the context of declining 
aggregate manufacturing employment between 1982 and 2016 (see Section 1), a declining or 
constant share of employment over the same period reflects – by definition – falling levels of 
employment.  
Conversely, in the context of rapid increases in aggregate capital stock (see Section 1.1), 
increasing shares of capital stock imply an increase in the actual levels of capital stock. These 
outcomes are indicative of capital-deepening.  In contrast, LI industries share of total capital-
stock has declined significantly since 1972, while the share of total manufacturing employment 
in these industries increased by 2.6 percentage points despite falling shares of aggregate output.  
This clearly indicates the importance of LI and ULI industries for employment creation in the 
sector and the equally poor employment generating capacity in CI and UCI industries. The fact 
that investment – and consequently growth – have not occurred in LI and ULI industries has 





2.3  Sub-Sectoral Growth Pre-1994 
Table 2.3 reveals that strong growth in real output was achieved in a majority of the sub-sectors 
under consideration pre-1994. Indeed, the significant trade protection in the economy at the 
time enabled this growth to an extent, allowing domestic producers to supply the domestic 
market with limited competition from foreign product substitutes. While growth in output was 
achieved in even the most labour-intensive industries in the sector, a notable feature of the 
sectoral performance pre-1994 is the pace at which various UCI sub-sectors were able to 
expand production.  Coke and petroleum products (7.9% per annum); beverages (5.6% per 
annum), other chemicals (5.4% per annum) and non-ferrous metals (5.5% per annum) all 
achieved average growth in real output in excess of 5% per annum.   
Table 2.3 further reveals that much of the output growth in these industries, with the 
exception of the other chemicals industry, was derived from rapid increases in capital inputs, 
with little corresponding increase in employment.  Capital investment in the coke petroleum 
products industry grew at an average rate of 12.4% per annum, with 6.3% per annum in the 
beverages industry and 7.3% per annum in the non-ferrous metals industry.  The corresponding 
employment growth for these industries was only 2.5%; 2% and 1% per annum respectively.  
A similar picture emerges when looking at the CI industries.  For example, the basic iron and 
steel industry achieved an average real output growth rate of 4% per annum with capital 
investment growing by 6.5% and employment levels declining by 0.4% per annum.  Similarly, 
the motor vehicles industry had a growth in capital investment of 3.3% while employment 
growth was on average negligible, increasing by only 0.1% per annum. These outcomes in UCI 
and CI industries alike reveal trends of capital deepening rather than capital widening. 




In contrast to the capital deepening occurring in UCI and CI manufacturing industries, 
Table 2.3 reveals trends of capital widening in LI and ULI industries over the same period, 
confirming that increased capital investment and growth in these industries resulted in 
substantial employment gains as well. The table reveals that LI and ULI industries also 
achieved strong growth under ISI strategies with the plastics industry, the professional and 
scientific equipment industry and the TV, radio and communications equipment industry 
achieving average growth in real output of 7.3%, 5.5% and 5% per annum respectively.   At 
the same time investment in capital stock in these industries increased at an average rate of 
5.3%, 2.2% and 1.3% per annum respectively, while employment also increased by 4.7%, 3.3% 
and 4.3% per annum respectively.  
 
2.4  Sub-Sectoral Growth Post-1994 
As noted in Section 1.2.2, industrial policy strategy post-1994 has increasingly emphasized the 
need to diversify the manufacturing base by moving away from resource-based manufacturing 
and promoting growth in non-traditional industries. Although there has been some success in 
this regard (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006:12; Edwards et al., 2008:5), Table 2.3 reveals that a 
majority of output growth has still been driven by industries which comprise South Africa’s 
MEC, all of which are highly capital-intensive. For example, the basic chemicals, other 
chemicals, coke and petroleum products, basic iron and steel and non-ferrous metals industries 
have all achieved growth in real output of 4% or greater per annum since 1994.  Moreover, 
Table 2.3 indicates that of what little diversification there has been in South Africa’s industrial 
base, this has continued to occur in relatively capital-intensive industries that have 
demonstrated poor employment outcomes since 1994. For example, a notable success story 
post-1994 has been the growth in the South African motor vehicles industry which has achieved 
an average growth in real output of 4.7% per annum. Yet despite this growth, employment in 
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the motor vehicles sector has declined on average by 0.8% per annum, with the industry 
becoming increasingly capital-intensive, signified by an average growth in the capital-labour 
ratio of 4.3% per annum since 1994. In contrast to the growth in UCI and CI industries since 
1994, LI and ULI industries have failed to demonstrate similar resilience in the face of 
increasing global competition. None of the LI and ULI industries reviewed has achieved an 
average growth in real output of greater than 4% per annum, while those LI and ULI industries 
that have demonstrated modest growth (for example: wood, electrical machinery and prof. and 
sci. equipment industries), have done so off a relatively small base (see Section 2.1).  
The slow growth of labour-intensive industries relative to capital-intensive industries can 
in part account for the rising capital-intensity in aggregate manufacturing. However, the rising 
capital-intensity within certain industries, in other words capital-deepening, has also been a 
contributing factor. Table 2.3 reveals that of the 28 sectors included in this analysis, 20 of them 
demonstrated increases in the capital-labour ratio since 1994, while 20 industries demonstrated 
average declines in employment levels. This has also been the case in relatively labour-
intensive industries that have managed to achieve some degree of output growth. For example, 
much of the growth in the ULI leather products industry is derived from supplying inputs to 
support output in the motor vehicles industry. Yet despite this, employment levels in the leather 
products industry have declined (-1.8% per annum on average), while the capital-labour ratio 
has grown at an average rate of 2.7% per annum.  Thus, the rising capital-intensity in aggregate 
manufacturing has been driven by some combination of the expansion of UCI and CI industries 
relative to more labour-intensive industries, as well as the trend of capital-deepening occurring 
across most manufacturing industries. Yet despite this fact, the shares of aggregate employment 
highlighted in Table 2.2 indicate that LI and ULI industries still remain significant contributors 




2.5  Productivity and Investment Decisions 
Table 2.4 presents data on the sub-sectoral shares of new fixed investment, as well as the sub-
sectoral compound annual growth rates of capital productivity (CP) and total factor 
productivity (TFP) between 1972 and 1994 and between 1995 and 2016. The table reveals that 
prior to 1994, capital investments were not deployed productively in those industries that 
commanded the largest shares of new investments.  For example, the coke and petroleum 
products; basic chemicals and basic iron and steel industries received a combined share of 
36.5% of all new investments, while CP and TFP gains in these industries were negative, 
implying a lack of efficiency in the investment decisions made. Undoubtedly, State investments 
in large-scale mega-projects such as Sasol played a significant role in this regard. Mohamed 
(1997:11) notes that the rapid increases in public foreign debt required to fund large-scale 
projects in capital and energy-intensive industries may have crowded out investment in other 
industries in the manufacturing sector.  For example, Mohamed (1997:10) cites that State 
borrowing between 1970 and 1976 accounted for 96% of total foreign denominated debt 
leading to a balance of payment deficit exceeding 5% of GDP.  Consequentially, foreign and 
domestic banks were less willing to lend money to private sector investors for projects in other 
industries.  
Furthermore by 1990, State-owned power utility Eskom accounted for 45% of public 
foreign debt and 16% of total foreign debt in South Africa.  In short, industrial policies seeking 
to provide cheap electricity and encourage investment in resource-based production inhibited 
investment and diversification in other industries in the sector. As a result, relatively labour-
intensive downstream industries such as the metal products or plastics industry received a 
significantly smaller portion of new investments, despite the reduced production costs enjoyed 
by large-upstream producers. By the same token, new investments increasingly flowed to 
industries that were not necessarily the most productive.   
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Table 2.4 further reveals that since 1994 productivity has improved in a majority of 
industries, with 20 of the 28 industries under review achieving gains in TFP, and 19 industries 
achieving gains in CP. On the one hand, trade liberalization has meant that firms have been 
forced to streamline and slim down operations in order to improve competitiveness (Thurlow, 
2006:3). On the other hand, increased foreign competition has meant that firms unable to 
improve productivity have likely been forced to exit the market, thus also positively influencing 
sub-sectoral productivity levels (Rankin, 2018; Rankin, 2016:4).  However, while there is a 
trend of increasing productivity since 1994, it is still apparent that various policy decisions 
continue to distort South Africa’s comparative advantage.  For example, while productivity has 
improved in relatively capital and labour-intensive industries alike, the bulk of new 
investments have still been made in capital and energy-intensive industries with the basic 
chemicals, coke and petroleum products and basic iron and steel industries accounting for 34% 
of new investments since 1994.  Moreover, industries that have been able to increase their 
respective shares of new investments the most, such as the motor vehicles and paper products 
industries have demonstrated negative CP gains and only negligible TFP gains. In stark 
contrast, only one LI or ULI industry (plastics) has been able to increase its share of new 
investments since 1994.  Somewhat paradoxically, the metal products, electrical machinery, 
clothing and TV, radio and communications equipment industries have all experienced 
declining shares of new investments since 1994, despite achieving positive CP and TFP gains. 
The productivity improvements in these industries indicate that there are pockets of relatively 
competitive labour-intensive activities, yet this has not resulted in a flow of investment into 
these industries for less productive industries. If employment creation is a primary objective of 
industrial policy, it would follow that government support should seek to leverage and promote 
these pockets of competitiveness.  In reality however, State support is still heavily weighted in 








SECTION 3 – Trade Flows, Government Assistance and Revealed 
Comparative Advantage 
 
Theories of comparative advantage (CA) have been widely used to explain and measure a 
country’s trade performance (Acharya, 2008:33). A country can benefit from international 
trade by specializing in the production and export of goods in which the opportunity cost of 
production is lowest, whilst simultaneously importing goods where there is no comparative 
advantage. Section 3 will present evidence that South Africa’s CA in capital-intensive 
production since 1994 has continued to be determined by distortive industrial policies that defy, 
rather than encourage, a more labour-absorbing growth path (Samson et al., 2001:6-7; Chang 
and Lin, 2009:4-5; Black et al., 2017:2). 
 
3.1  Trade Flows in South African Manufacturing 
 
3.1.1  Sub-Sectoral Export Performance 
The manner in which South Africa’s export-profile has evolved over time has had profound 
implications for the pattern of trade on the one hand, and the inclusiveness of industrialization 
and growth on the other (Edwards and Alves, 2006:474).  While exports of South African 
manufacturers have grown as a share of GDP (see Section 1.3), they have failed to reach the 
levels witnessed in East Asia and more outward-oriented manufacturing sectors in South and 
Central American economies (Edwards and Alvers, 2006:473; DTI, 2010:26). Moreover, 
South Africa’s export-profile, much like aggregate production, remains highly capital and 
resource-intensive (Black et al., 2017:5).   
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Table 3.1 below details the share of manufactured exports in the industry in 1972, 1994 
and 2016 respectively. Table 3.1 reveals that a majority of South African manufactured exports 
in 1972 were derived from capital-intensive, resource-based industries such as basic iron and 
steel and non-ferrous metals, which accounted for a combined share of 35% of total 
manufactured exports. UCI and CI industries accounted for a combined share of 51% of total 
exports in 1972, while LI and ULI industries accounted for a combined share of only 21% of 
total manufactured exports, with a majority of these derived from the machinery and textiles 
industries. By 1994, the South African manufactures export profile had become even more 
capital-intensive, with UCI and CI industries accounting for 62% of total exports while LI and 
ULI industries accounted for only 25.6%. By 2016, the trend of increasing capital-intensity is 
still very much apparent, with UCI and CI industries accounting for 63% of total manufactured 
exports, while LI and ULI industries accounted for only 23%.  
As noted previously, industrial policy post-1994 has sought to diversify South Africa’s 
export profile by encouraging growth in non-traditional exports and becoming less dependent 
on resource-based exports (Black et al., 2017:6-7; DT, 2007:10-12). In this regard, there has 
been a degree of success, both in terms of increasing exports (see Section 1.3) and diversifying 
exports. However, much of this diversification has occurred in capital-intensive industries such 
as the motor vehicles industry (Black et al., 15-17), which increased its share of manufactured 
exports significantly from 3.5% in 1994 to 17% in 2016. In contrast, apart from the notable 
improvement in the export share of the machinery industry (from 6.9% in 1994 to 11.7% in 
2016), there has been no significant improvement in export growth in ULI and LI industries.  
Table 3.1 further reveals that the composition of manufacturing exports is even more 
capital and resource-intensive than the composition of real output. To illustrate, in 2016 UCI 
and CI industries constituted 55% of total output, while the combined share of total exports 




of total exports; the basic iron and steel; non-ferrous metals; coke and petroleum products and 
basic chemicals industries hold a combined share of 25% of total output, while constituting 
32% of total exports. Consequently, the growth in exports of manufactured goods has not 





 Share of Exports by Industry (%) 
 1972 1994 2016 
Basic Chemicals 3.4 7.0 6.6 
Beverages 0.2 1.3 2.3 
Coke and Petroleum Products 1.0 0.6 2.3 
Non-Ferrous Metals 13.8 9.2 6.2 
Other Chemicals 3.6 5.2 6.8 
Motor Vehicles 1.1 3.5 16.8 
Basic Iron and Steel 20.7 26.6 16.5 
Glass 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Non-Metallic Minerals 1.9 0.9 1.1 
Paper and Paper Products 5.1 7.0 3.5 
Tobacco 0.0 0.4 0.4 
Food 20.7 6.4 7.5 
Other Transport Equipment 0.3 1.1 1.3 
Other Manufacturing 6.3 3.6 2.6 
Printing and Publishing 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Rubber 0.4 1.0 1.1 
Electrical Machinery 0.8 1.5 1.5 
Machinery 8.6 6.9 11.7 
Metal Products 2.4 3.6 5.0 
Plastics 0.1 0.3 0.6 
Professional and Scientific Equipment 1.7 1.4 0.9 
TV, Radio and Communication Equipment 0.1 0.6 0.8 
Textiles 5.1 3.7 0.8 
Wood 0.8 2.1 1.6 
Clothing 1.0 2.1 0.7 
Footwear 0.4 0.6 0.1 
Furniture 0.0 1.8 0.5 
Leather and Leather Products 0.3 1.1 0.5 
Table 3.1 Share of Exports by Industry in 1972, 1994 & 2016 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 





that State employment as central objective of outward-oriented growth (Black et al., 2017:3-4; 
DTI, 2007:10-12.  
Consider Table 3.2 which details the number of employees required to produce R1million 
of output in 1994 and 2016 respectively, as well as the export shares of the different industries 
listed and the average export elasticity of employment (AEEE) for the periods 1992 to 1994 
and 1995 to 2016
5
. The data present a useful means of understanding the employment effects 
of South Africa’s current manufacturing export structure. For example, it is clear from Table 
3.2 that in a majority of industries in 2016, fewer employees were required to produce 
R1million of output than in 1994.  Thus, any growth in demand derived from an export 
stimulus, would have less positive impact on employment. Additionally, the industries that 
have shown the most success in terms of boosting demand on the back of export-intensification, 
are also the industries that are the least labour-absorbing. Consequently, the positive output 
effects derived from trade liberalization have been in industries that require the fewest number 
of employees to satisfy any increase in production. For example, an exogenous positive shock 
in export demand of R1million for motor vehicles would require only 0.7 employees to produce 
the required output. In contrast, an exogenous positive shock in export demand for clothing, 
where the share of exports has diminished, would require 2.6 employees to produce this output. 
Thus, a combination of decreasing labour-intensity within industries, as well as the growing 
share of exports in low labour-absorbing industries, has meant that the outward-oriented 




The author calculated elasticities of employment using a log-linear regression, similar to the approach adopted 
by Ali, Ghazi and Msadfa [Ali et al] (2017). The author uses these elasticities more as an accounting measure to 





This is underscored by the negative AEEE between 1994 and 2016, highlighting the lack 
of employment benefits derived from South African manufactured exports. Between 1972 and 
1994, a period characterized by very little export growth or diversification, South Africa had a 
higher export elasticity of employment (0.21) than the period 1995 to 2016 (-3.6), a period 





Per R1-million  
of Output 




Per R1-million  
of Output 
Share of  
Exports 
(%) 
Basic Chemicals  0.9 7.0 0.3 6.6 
Beverages  1.1 1.3 0.6 2.3 
Coke and Petroleum Products  0.4 0.6 0.2 2.3 
Non-Ferrous Metals  1.5 9.2 0.5 6.2 
Other Chemicals  0.8 5.2 0.5 6.8 
Motor Vehicles 2.0 3.5 0.7 16.8 
Basic Iron and Steel  1.4 26.6 0.6 16.5 
Glass  2.9 0.4 0.8 0.4 
Non-Metallic Minerals  4.1 0.9 0.6 1.1 
Paper and Paper Products  1.1 7.0 0.7 3.5 
Tobacco  0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Food  1.8 6.4 0.9 7.5 
Other Transport Equipment  2.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 
Other Manufacturing  1.8 3.6 0.8 2.6 
Printing and Publishing  2.0 0.2 1.5 0.3 
Rubber  2.1 2.0 0.8 1.0 
Electrical Machinery  2.2 1.5 1.1 1.5 
Machinery  2.3 6.9 1.6 11.7 
Metal Products  2.4 3.6 1.2 5.0 
Plastics  2.0 0.3 1.7 0.6 
Professional and Sci. Equip,  2.8 1.4 1.6 0.9 
TV, Radio and Comm. Equip. 1.4 0.6 1.5 0.8 
Textiles  3.9 3.7 1.5 0.8 
Wood  3.0 2.1 1.2 1.6 
Clothing  6.0 2.1 2.6 0.7 
Footwear  4.3 0.6 1.7 0.1 
Furniture  4.9 1.8 2.1 0.5 
Leather and Leather Products  4.0 1.1 1.7 0.5 
Export Elasticity 
of Employment 
(1972-1994)    =    0.2 (1995-2016)    =    -3.6 
Table 3.2 Share of Exports vs. Employees per R1million by Industry & the Average Export Elasticity  
                of Employment for SA Manufacturing in 1994 and 2016 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 




by noting that the output elasticity of employment in South African manufacturing has been 
negative since 1994, despite the rapid growth in manufactured exports.  
 
3.2  Import Dominance  
Another factor that has contributed to poor employment outcomes in South African 
manufacturing is the increased pressure from foreign producers supplying the domestic market.  
Under the highly protective and complex trade barriers pre-1994, LI and ULI producers in 
South Africa were able to supply the domestic market with little threat from foreign 
competition.  This has changed considerably with the liberalization of trade, resulting in a 
significant increase in light manufactured imports since 1994. Consider Table 3.3 which 
presents the import penetration ratios (IPR) for 1972, 1994 and 2016 of various manufacturing 
industries in South Africa
6
. Additionally, Figure 3.1 details as an index, the growth in import 
volumes by factor-intensity from 1994 to 2016. 
Since 1994, the level of manufacturing imports has increased dramatically. This growth, 
as well as the composition of these imports, has been detrimental to the employment prospects 
in South African manufacturing. This is confirmed by the rapid increase in import volumes and 
IPRs in ULI industries (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1). Significantly, the increase in IPRs in 
ULI industries accelerated rapidly from 2002 onwards, coinciding with the inclusion of China 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Edwards and Jenkins, 2015:447). By 2009, 
China had become South Africa’s largest trading partner, with a majority of Chinese imports 
consisting of products from traditionally labour-absorbing industries such as the clothing; 
textiles, footwear and furniture industries, as well as various higher-technology electronics and 
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machinery industries (Edwards and Jenkins, 2015:450-452)
7
. This is borne out by the increase 
in IPRs between 1972 and 2016 of 16% to 53%; 8% to 43%; and 3% to 33% for the clothing; 
footwear and furniture industries respectively.  In contrast, the lowest growth of Chinese 
imports has come in relatively capital-intensive and resource-based products such as various 
chemical products, beverages and coke and petroleum products (Edwards and Jenkins, 
2015:450-452). This trend is highlighted by the comparatively low growth rate of UCI imports 













































Figure 3.1 Growth in Imports by Factor-Intensity  
 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry 










Import Penetration Ratios (%) 
1972 1994 2016 
Basic Chemicals  24.1 28.4 35.2 
Beverages  2.9 3.2 8.4 
Coke and Petroleum Products  5.8 0.8 1.7 
Non-Ferrous Metals  17.8 14.0 59.4 
Other Chemicals  25.8 30.8 47.4 
Motor Vehicles 32.0 24.2 65.1 
Basic Iron and Steel  15.7 10.6 20.0 
Glass  18.9 15.3 30.3 
Non-Metallic Minerals  6.9 9.0 20.2 
Paper and Paper Products  17.7 14.3 22.9 
Tobacco  3.9 1.6 8.3 
Food  8.0 7.6 17.0 
Other Transport Equipment  31.9 49.2 72.1 
Other Manufacturing  15.7 11.5 28.9 
Printing and Publishing  4.2 4.8 6.2 
Rubber  18.7 29.0 66.8 
Electrical Machinery  28.9 34.1 49.7 
Machinery  49.8 62.5 92.2 
Metal Products  10.2 12.7 32.4 
Plastics  4.8 7.0 21.1 
Professional and Sci. Equip 84.9 73.7 94.8 
TV, Radio and Comm. Equip 38.2 50.8 89.4 
Textiles  24.7 24.6 36.6 
Wood  12.2 11.2 10.6 
Clothing  16.4 8.1 58.3 
Footwear  7.8 11.8 42.9 
Furniture  2.9 5.0 33.3 
Leather and Leather Products  26.3 40.6 46.4 
Table 3.3 Import Penetration Ratios by Industry in 1972, 1994 & 2016.  
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
*Author’s Own Calculations 
 
 56 
3.3  Revealed Comparative Advantage  
This section examines the comparative advantage (CA) of South African manufacturing. In 
theoretical trade models, CA is expressed in terms of relative prices evaluated in the absence 
of trade. Since there is difficulty in observing these prices, it is useful to measure comparative 
advantage indirectly by calculating a country’s revealed comparative advantage (RCA).  In this 
paper, the Balassa RCA Index is used. This index utilizes the observed patterns of country and 
global trade in order to determine the products in which a country has a comparative advantage 
or disadvantage (French, 2014:2-5).  Thus, the trade patterns in South African manufacturing 
described above can provide an indication as to where South Africa’s RCA lies.  
 
The RCA indices are calculated using the following formula: 
 
The index is defined as the ratio between two shares. The numerator is defined as the share of 
a given product in a country’s export profile, while the denominator is defined as the share of 
a given product in world exports. A country is said to have a comparative advantage in a 
particular product when its RCA index value is greater than unity (RCA>1) and a comparative 




§ RCAijt is the index value for i industry in country j in period t.  
§ X ijt refers to the exports from industry i of country j in period t 






• RCAijt   index value for i industry in country j in period t.  
• Xijt  refers to the exports from industry i of country j in period t. 





At a glance, the combination of increasing capital-intensity in the export profile and the 
striking labour-intensity of South African imports (see Section 3.1) would lead one to conclude 
that South Africa has a comparative advantage (CA) in relatively capital and energy-intensive 
products, despite the large amount of surplus labour in the economy (Black et al., 2017:2). 
Implicitly, one cannot assume that CA is simply derived by initial factor endowments, but 
rather that it is derived from a combination of factor endowments and various industrial policies 
that drive the process of industrialization and the advancement of certain industries over others 
(Black and Hasson, 2012:3; Chang and Lin, 2009:4; Samson et al., 2001:6-7).  
By conducting an RCA analysis, this section seeks to compare the evolution of South 
Africa’s CA with that of various comparator countries in order to establish the extent to which 
South Africa has defied its CA by encouraging production in relatively capital and energy-
intensive industries, whilst simultaneously failing to exploit its endowment of abundant labour.  
(Chang and Lin, 2009:4-5; Black et al., 2017:3). To this end, the section will first present 
evidence that the RCA of South African manufacturing lies, somewhat paradoxically, in UCI 
and CI products, despite large endowments of surplus labour. The section then presents further 
evidence that this evolution is in stark contrast to other emerging economies and developing 
countries in general.  The data required for this analysis is sourced from the International Trade 
Center (ITC), utilizing country specific and world export data, at the three-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) between 2001 and 2016. The three-digit 
classification is utilized for ease in categorizing various products by industry and factor-
intensity. 
3.3.1  The RCA of South African Manufacturing 
Consider Table 3.4 which presents the results from the RCA analysis conducted for 28 
industries in the South African manufacturing sector. In 2001, there were twelve industries that 
had a RCA of greater than unity, including two ULI industries (leather and furniture); one LI 
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industry (wood); one ICI industry (food); four CI industries (tobacco; paper; non-metallic 
minerals and basic iron and steel) and four UCI industries (non-ferrous metals; coke and 
petroleum; beverages and basic chemicals). By 2016, only nine industries demonstrated a RCA 
greater than unity, eight of which were classified as either CI or UCI and six of which 
encompass the MEC apparent in South Africa.  
In striking contrast, South Africa has an RCA in only one LI industry (wood) and no 
(zero) RCA in any ULI industries. These outcomes confirm that the manufacturing sector 
remains highly dependent on CI and UCI production as a source of CA, with no CA being 
derived from industries that would traditionally exploit the country’s surplus labour (Black et 
al., 2017:3). Instead, the RCA analysis indicates that South Africa’s CA remains in energy and 
capital-intensive activities, reflecting a high degree of path dependence and a lack of dynamism 
in more labour-absorbing activities.  Moreover, those industries in which RCA has improved 
since 2001, such as basic chemicals, other chemicals and motor vehicles are also highly capital 
or energy-intensive implying that this trend is not only persistent but has increased.   
Despite government’s stated objective of employment creation post-1994, industrial 
policy has in fact continued to reinforce a capital and energy-intensive development trajectory 
rather than alter it for the purpose of job creation and inclusive growth (DTI, NIPF, 2007:6, 12-
15). For example, a capital depreciation allowance was granted to large-scale resource-based 
producers in the mid 1990’s and large investment tax incentives between 2002 and 2005 were 
provided to capital-intensive projects in industries such as basic iron and steel; non-ferrous 
metals and basic chemicals (Black and Roberts, 2009:225; Black et al, 2017:22). Additionally, 
despite Eskom’s capacity constraints, agreements were reached with Alcan in 2007 for an 
aluminum smelter at Coega IDZ, including a subsidized electricity price of R0.14/kWh, 




Table 3.4 Revealed Comparative Advantage Index by Sub-Sector and Factor-Intensity 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
*Author’s own calculations 
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African households (Black and Roberts, 2009:225; Black et al., 2017:22). (Fortunately, this 
smelter was never built).  
While these policies have undoubtedly had an impact on the extent to which a RCA has 
continued to develop in UCI and CI industries post-1994, they have nonetheless created very 
little employment in an economy where the most glaring inefficiency is the abundance of 
unemployed labour. As argued by Chang and Lin (2009:5) and Black and Hasson, (2012:3), if 
the purpose of industrial policy is to facilitate structural change in a way that ensures the most 
efficient use of resources, then ensuring growth in labour-absorbing industries in South Africa 
should be the central theme of industrial policy. Yet, while investment incentives may 
encourage investment by reducing the UCC, they are likely to benefit industries where the cost 
of capital is the significant cost component of production. Consequently, these incentives do 
very little to encourage a flow of investment away from capital-intensive industries into more 
labour-absorbing industries. Instead they have proven to encourage more investment into 
capital-intensive industries, proliferating a path dependence that has developed from years of 
industrial policy that has failed to exploit the country’s surplus labour.  
Diversification away from resource-based manufacturing has also been a stated objective 
of industrial policy since 1994 (DTI, NIPF, 2007:6). To some extent this has been successful, 
as exemplified by the improvement in RCA of the motor vehicle industry from 0.9 in 2001 to 
1.5 by 2016. However, this improvement has been strongly assisted by large-scale government 
support. For example, the Parliamentary Budget Office (2016) reports that the motor vehicle 
industry has received 68% of all financial industrial support (in the form of various subsidies 
and rebate allowances) since 1994, and 82% since 2006 (Parliamentary Budget Office [PBO], 
2016), much of which is accounted for by various provisions under the MIDP which was 
launched in 1995 (Black and Roberts, 2009:226).  Thus, while the growth in the motor vehicle 
industry has enabled some degree of diversification in South African manufacturing, it has 
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come at a significant cost to the State with little added employment benefit given the capital-
intensity of motor vehicle production (see Section 2). In stark contrast to the State provisions 
for the motor vehicle industry, LI and ULI industries combined have received only 13% of total 
subsidies provided to the manufacturing sector between 2006 and 2016
8
.  
Although the RCA indices in Table 3.4 may indicate a lack of competitiveness in labour-
intensive production, these indices ignore the fact that government support has significantly 
assisted the establishment of CA in capital-intensive industries such as the motor vehicle and 
basic and other chemicals industries.  On the one hand, this reveals that government support 
did play a significant role in developing the competitiveness (or simply RCA) in targeted 
industries. On the other hand, it reveals that had government support been directed at more 
labour-absorbing production activities, then a RCA may have been achieved in labour-
intensive industries as well.  Moreover, given the abundance of low-skilled labour, it’s likely 
that achieving a RCA in labour-intensive industries would come at a lower cost to the State, 
with significantly larger economy-wide efficiency gains (Lin, 2009:6-7; Black and Hasson, 
2012:3; Black et al., 2017:3).  While this submission may be contentious, what is clear is that 
industrial policy has continued to favour the development of capital-intensive industries, 
instead of emphatically supporting labour-intensive industries which better exploit the 
country’s factor endowments.  
 
3.3.2  Analysis of RCA in Comparator Countries 
Based on the arguments put forth by Chang and Lin (2009:5-6), the authors might liken South 
Africa’s industrial policy approach to one that is CA defying since the country fails to exploit 
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its vast endowment of low or semi-skilled labour. Moreover, instead of optimizing the factor 
endowments available, policy seeks to promote production in sub-optimal, capital and skill-
intensive activities which in turn struggle to compete without significant government support 
(Nattrass and Seekings, 2013:7).  To consider this proposition objectively Table 3.5 below 
compares the evolution of South Africa’s RCA with that of other developing countries that are 
likely to have faced similar initial factor endowments.  In this context, Table 3.5 details the 
RCA of China, India, Mexico and Brazil, as well as an aggregated RCA of developing 
economies in general between 2001 and 2016.  This period after 2000 is useful to analyze as 
trade has liberalized since the turn of the millennium and thus it is expected that the RCA 
indices derived from increased trade flows are likely to more accurately reflect the true 
comparative CA of these countries. For brevity, these RCA indices are displayed by factor 
intensity, with various products classified as either UCI; CI; ICI; LI and ULI. 
The table reveals the extent to which South Africa’s industrialization path has differed 
to other developing economies.  Of all of the countries included in the table, only Brazil and 
South Africa do not have a RCA in products manufactured in either LI or ULI industries.  Brazil 
has a RCA in ICI products, while South Africa’s only RCA is in CI and UCI products. 
Moreover, when comparing South Africa’s RCA to an average of developing market 
economies, it’s clear that South Africa’s advantage differs markedly. Developing economies 
on average demonstrated an RCA in LI and ULI products with no RCA in either CI or UCI 
industries, while South Africa has a RC disadvantage in both the LI and ULI product categories 
with a notable RCA in CI and UCI alike. 
Table 3.5 highlights that countries such as India, which has a RCA in UCI, CI and ULI 
products and Mexico, which has a RCA in CI and LI products have promoted production in 
more capital-intensive industries whilst simultaneously promoting production growth in 





Table 3.5 Revealed Comparative Advantage of Comparator Countries & Developing Country Average 
Source: International Trade Centre (ITC) 2018. 
*Author’s Own Calculations 
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manufactured export in 2016 were motor vehicles ($101 billion worth of exports), but it also 
exported $82 billion worth of electrical machinery and various parts thereof (International 
Trade Centre [ITC], 2018).  Similarly, India’s largest manufacturing exports in 2016 were 
motor vehicles ($16.6 billion), but it also exported $16 billion worth of machinery and $8.8 
billion worth in clothing and apparel (ITC, 2018).  In striking contrast, South Africa exported 
$9.7 billion worth of motor vehicles and $8.7 billion worth of iron and steel products, while 






SECTION 4: - The Relative Competitiveness of Unit Labour Costs in South 
African Labour-Intensive Manufacturing 
 
Wages in South Africa remain a highly contentious issue, with several commentators citing 
relatively high wages as a primary reason for the lack of competitiveness in labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries (Edwards and Golub, 2004:6; Rankin, 2016:24-25; Natrrass, 
2014:21; Nattrass and Seekings, 2013:7 and 2019; DTI, 2010:28). The preceding three sections 
highlighted the role that industrial policy has played in distorting South Africa’s CA away from 
labour-intensive production. This section seeks to explore the legitimacy of claims that 
relatively high wages in South Africa remain the critical constraint to labour-intensive 
manufacturing growth and implicitly, a CA in labour-intensive production. In order to do so, 
South African unit labour costs (ULC), as a measure of labour cost competitiveness, are 
compared to ULC of selected comparator countries to determine the relative cost 
competitiveness of labour in South African manufacturing. The analysis compares ULC in 
production of seven selected labour-intensive product categories to determine the extent to 
which ULC in South Africa are competitive to the comparator countries. 
 
4.1 ULC as a Measure of International Cost Competitiveness 
This section examines the credibility and effectiveness of ULC as a measure of international 
competitiveness, drawing on previous studies conducted by Golub (1994); Golub and Heish 
(2000); Edwards and Golub (2004); Matswalela and Van Zyl (2016); De Broeck, Guscina and 
Mehres [De Broeck et al.], 2012:5 and the DTI, (2010).  
 
ULC can be defined as the ratio of wages (or labour compensation (LC)) and labour 




The formula illustrates how an increase in LC greater than the increase in LP will result in an 
increase in ULC. Conversely, an increase in LP greater than the increase in LC will result in a 
reduction in ULC
9
. Implicitly, the argument that lower foreign wage rates can hurt domestic 
industries doesn’t depict the full story. What matters is the level of wages relative to 
productivity. In countries that demonstrate low levels of labour productivity, rapidly rising 
wages can have negative impacts on long-term profitability (Felipe and Kumar, 2010:2). 
Conversely, rising wages can also be offset by rising productivity levels and can thus be 
compatible with long-term profitability.   
Thus, ULC have often been used as a means of measuring the relative competitiveness 
of countries, sectors or firms. The usefulness of this approach is enhanced when the link 
between ULC and prices is strong (De Broek, et al: 2012:5; Felipe and Kumar, 2010:3). For 
example, when labour compensation constitutes a major component of production costs, ULC 
will strongly influence prices. Conversely, where production is more capital-intensive, ULC 
are likely to be less effective as a measure of cost competitiveness as prices are likely to be 
determined by other production factors such as the ownership and use of various technologies 
encompassed in the production process or access to capital equipment. However, given that the 
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ULC growth is equal to the growth in labour compensation minus the growth in labour productivity (De 









• ULCij refers to the unit labour cost of industry i in period j.  
• LCij refers to the labour compensation of industry i in period j. 




focus of this analysis remains solely on labour-intensive products, where labour constitutes a 
significant portion of production costs, the link between labour costs and price competitiveness 
is assumed to be strong. The implication is that firms in countries with higher ULC are likely 
to be less price competitive than firms operating in countries where ULC are lower.  
De Broek et al. (2012:4) notes that the link between ULC and prices is stronger when 
product market competition is higher. Where competition is low, firms are price setters, with 
the costs of production having less influence on the level of prices. Conversely where product 
market competition is high, prices often reflect as much, with firms forced to keep prices low 
to remain competitive (De Broek et al., 2012:5; Felipe and Kumar, 2010:3-4). This effect is 
more apparent where room for specialization and diversification is limited, which is often the 
case with highly labour-intensive products such as clothing, textiles and footwear (Asian 
Development Bank, 2015:78; Edwards and Jenkins, 2015:449). In South Africa, where trade 
liberalization has exposed domestic labour-intensive producers to fierce competition from 
foreign producers (see Section 3), the assumption of a highly competitive market for labour-
intensive products is justified and thus it can be assumed that ULC will provide a good 
indication of cost competitiveness.  
The ULC approach to assessing cost competitiveness is further supported when 
considering the changing dynamics in global production (Edwards and Golub, 2004:6). In a 
global economy that is increasingly characterized by the global dispersion of production, where 
the production process of a single product is fragmented into distinct stages, that often take 
place in different countries, the cost and productivity of non-tradable inputs, such as labour, 
have become an important determinant in the location of production (Edwards and Golub, 
2004:6; Low and Tijaja, 2013:1-2). For example, the production processes encompassing the 
high-volume, simple assembly of various consumer electronics products, has shifted to 
economies in South East Asia where wages are relatively low and workers often work upwards 
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of 60 hours a week to improve productivity levels (Edwards and Golub, 2004:6). For this 
reason, by considering both the productivity and cost component of labour as an input in the 
production process, ULC can provide an effective method of assessing the relative 
attractiveness of a country for foreign direct investment in labour-intensive manufacturing.   
However, there are limitations to utilizing the ULC approach to assess relative 
competitiveness. For example, the ULC approach ignores various market access or trade 
agreements that allow countries to export to markets without the added cost burden of paying 
duties on goods (De Broek et al, 2012:8; Edwards and Golub, 2004:10).  In these cases, ULC 
may not provide a thorough determinant of competitiveness in global markets.  Additionally, 
the ULC approach to assessing competitiveness does not account for the effects of various 
trade protection policies, government assistance or subsidies. These factors may similarly 
artificially enhance a country's cost competitiveness despite prevailing levels of ULC.  
 
4.2  Relative ULC Analysis in Labour-Intensive Manufacturing 
In order to determine the relative competitiveness of labour costs in South African 
manufacturing, this section provides a comparative analysis of South African ULC in the 
production of seven labour-intensive product categories against the ULC of 20 comparator 
countries. The comparator countries are Brazil; Bulgaria; China; Egypt; Ethiopia; Hungary; 
India; Indonesia; Malaysia; Mauritius; Mexico; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Russia; Singapore; Spain; Turkey and Vietnam, while the seven labour-intensive product 
categories consist of textiles; clothing; footwear; rubber products; plastics; consumer 
electronics and furniture.  
Country and product category level data is sourced from the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization’s (UNIDO) Industrial Statistics database at a 3- and 4-digit ISIC 
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level. The UNIDO database provides data on real output (expressed in US$), total wage bill 
(expressed in US$), the number of firms and the number of employees for each country and 
product category. The data for these variables is utilized to construct the two key variable 
components for ULC, namely per employee LP and the average real wage per employee or 
LC
10
.  Using the constructed ULC variable for each country, a relative ULC index is derived, 
such that the ULC in each country is compared to the sample average for a given product 
category in a given year. An index value of unity implies that a country’s ULC is equal to that 
of the sample average, while an index value less than unity implies that a country’s ULC are 
more competitive than the sample average for a given product in a given year and vice-versa
11
.  
Table 4.1 presents the relative ULC index values for 21 countries (including South 
Africa) for the seven product categories in question for the year 2000 and 2015 respectively. 
This allows for both the absolute level of ULC in each country to be assessed against the sample 
average for the two years under review, as well as for the change in a country’s respective ULC 
to be compared relative to the sample average over time (Edwards and Golub, 2004). If a 
country’s ULC index value is lower in 2015 than it was in 2000 then this implies that ULC in 
that country have become more competitive relative to the sample average over time. 
Additionally, as noted by Van Ark, Stuivenvold and Ypma [Van Ark et al] (2005:4), in order 
to acquire a full understanding of differences in relative ULC competitiveness across countries, 
it’s critical to evaluate the drivers of changing ULC competitiveness as well, that is, changes 
in a country’s relative LC and LP. To account for this, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the LC index 
values and LP index values for the seven product categories and comparator countries under 
 
10 Per employee LP is calculated as a ratio of total output and total employees, while per employee LC is 
calculated as total wages divided by total employees.  
11





. The tables reveal that for the most part, a country’s relative competitiveness in terms 
of ULC differs significantly across different product categories, highlighting the importance of 
using disaggregated ULC data when comparing ULC across countries. In addition, the 
components of ULC (that drive changes in competitiveness over time) also differ significantly 
between countries and product categories.  
In the year 2000, South African ULC were more competitive relative to the sample 
average in only two of the seven product categories, namely textiles and footwear. By the year 
2015, South Africa had a ULC advantage over the sample average in only one of the seven 
product categories, namely furniture. The table indicates that the notion that higher wages have 
been the cause of the decreased competitiveness is only partially correct. Across all seven 
product categories the figures reveal that poor productivity levels are equally important when 
explaining the high ULC relative to the comparative sample. For example, the average LC in 
South Africa for textiles were in fact more competitive in 2015, relative to the sample average, 
than they were in 2000. However, the significantly lower relative LP in 2015 offsets this and 
consequently overall relative ULC competitiveness was reduced. Whereas, the high relative 
LP in Turkey meant that despite having higher average LC than the sample average, ULC were 
more competitive than the sample average in a majority of product categories in 2015.  
Table 4.1 suggests that in contrast to South Africa, by 2015, countries such as China, 
India and Vietnam demonstrated a ULC advantage over the sample average in all seven product 
categories, reaffirming the common theoretical and empirical proposition that these economies 
have generally benefitted from lower wages and economies of scale advantages from supplying 
large and growing domestic and regional markets (Matswalela and Van Zyl, 2016:385; DTI, 
 
12
 The same mathematical interpretation of ULC index values can be applied to LC index values. 
However, when assessing LP index values, the opposite interpretation should be applied, such that a value 
greater than unity implies greater competitiveness than the sample average and vise-versa.   
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2010:28-29; Edwards and Jenkins, 2014:1; Nattrass and Seekings, 2013). In the case of China, 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 highlight that while significantly lower relative LC in 2000 contributed to 
China’s ULC advantage and dominance in global labour-intensive manufacturing, by 2015, the 
country’s ULC advantage was derived by significantly higher relative LP. This is consistent 
with the notion that growth in Chinese LP has contributed significantly to the country’s 
dominance in global manufacturing over the past two decades, despite consistent increases in 
wages (Nofri, 2015; Su and Heshmati, 2011:4-5; Kaplan, 2016). 
Similarly, while low relative LC in 2015 contributed to Vietnam’s relative ULC 
advantage (see Table 4.3), improvements in relative LP are largely responsible for the 
improvement in relative ULC competitiveness for all seven product categories. These results 
underpin the rapid growth in manufacturing in the country over the past decade, particularly in 
high-volume, labour-intensive production (Eckardt, Mishra and Tuan Dinh, 2018).  
The importance of improving LP is further underscored when considering countries from 
a similar macroeconomic disposition to South Africa, such as Brazil and Mexico. For example, 
Table 4.1 suggests that in 2000, ULC in Brazil were more competitive than the sample average 
in six of the seven product categories but by 2015, ULC were less competitive than the sample 
average in all seven of the product categories. Table 4.2 and 4.3 suggest that in all seven 
product categories, relative LC changed only marginally between 2000 and 2015, while relative 
LP in 2015 was far less competitive than in 2000. This result is similar in the Mexican case.  
 
4.3  ULC and International Competitiveness 
The results presented above seem to dispel the common view that South African wages are the 
primary reason for the poor performance of labour-intensive production (Nattrass and 











suggesting that LP relative to wages (LC) is equally important when considering the cost 
competitiveness of South African labour. However, in order to ascertain the extent to which 
this has hampered growth in South African labour-intensive industries, it is necessary to 
examine the relationship between ULC and competitiveness in global markets. Edwards and 
Golub (2004) show that the growth in South African manufactured exports in the 1990’s (see 
Sections 1 and 3) was driven, in conjunction with the rapid liberalization of trade, by a steady 
decline in ULC. However, as shown in the analysis above, relative South African ULC in 
labour-intensive production have not improved since 2000, coinciding with stagnant output 
growth, low exports and high import penetration in these product categories (see Sections 2 
and 3).   
In order to understand the extent to which uncompetitive ULC have impacted on growth 
in South African labour-intensive manufacturing, this section employs a simple econometric 
model to establish the empirical relationship between ULC and export performance, 
supplemented by country-specific examples in order to achieve a more nuanced understanding 
of the relationship. Export performance is used in this case as a means of determining the 
relative competitiveness in global markets of a country’s products for a prevailing level of 
ULC. The methodology adopted in this analysis draws on the work of Edwards and Golub 
(2004); Ali et al. (2017) and De Broeck et al (2012), where the authors seek to empirically test 
the relationship of ULC on export performance, both in terms of export value as well as the 
share of global exports.  
The ULC elasticities for export value (expressed in US$), as well as the share of world 
exports (expressed as percentage of global exports) for a given product category can be defined 




Equations 1 and 2 are applied to seven separate panel datasets for each of the product 
categories examined in the previous section, with data collected over the period 2000 to 2015. 
ULC data is derived from the UNIDO Indastat database, while country and global product-
specific export data is sourced from the ITC database at the 2-digit ISIC level. Equations 1 and 
2 allow for simple point-elasticity estimates to be derived using a log-linear regression of the 
log of ULC on the logged value of exports and the logged value of export share respectively
13
. 
By utilizing the fixed-effects models defined by Equations 1 and 2, the analysis can account 
for inter-country differences such as size and geographic location, each of which may impact 
on export performance. While the size of the sample in the panel data sets allow for a degree 
of robustness in these estimation results, the elasticities derived from this equation should be 
viewed more as a simple elasticity measurement of the relationship between ULC and export 
performance rather than a robust statistical estimation (Ali et al., 2017:12).  
Table 4.4 below presents the estimated ULC point-elasticity of exports for each product 
category. These elasticities represent the sample average elasticity among the comparator 
 
13 Export shares have been normalized to one hundred to allow for positive logged values. 
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countries over the 15-year period reviewed
14
. With the exception of the plastics product 
category, the elasticities are statistically significant at either the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. As 
expected, Table 4.4 further reveals that in all product categories excluding plastics, the 
elasticity is less than zero, implying a negative relationship between the level of ULC and the 
value of exports ceteris paribus, such that a decrease in ULC is associated with an increase in 
the value of exports and vise-versa. 
The magnitude of this relationship is greatest in the clothing product category, where a 
1% decrease in the sample average ULC is associated with a 0.34% sample average increase 
in the value of exports. The textiles product category exhibits a weaker elasticity than the 
clothing product category, with a 1% average decrease in ULC associated with a 0.19% average 
increase in export value. In the footwear and furniture product categories, a 1% average 
decrease in ULC is associated with a 0.20% and 0.23% average increase in export value 
respectively. In the rubber and consumer electronics product categories a 1% average decrease 
in ULC is associated with a 0.17% and 0.18% average increase in export value respectively. 
The plastics product category demonstrates a weak relationship between ULC and export 
value, implying that in the sample countries, labour costs are not necessarily a primary source 
of competitiveness in global export markets for these products. These findings tentatively 
confirm that on average, the more labour-intensive the production process for a product is, the 
greater the impact that ULC will have on the ability to compete in global markets. Countries 
in the sample that have been able to reduce ULC for a given product – or maintain ULC at 
levels lower than competitors – have been able to increase their respective export values for 
 
14 An elasticity equal to one implies that for a 1% increase in ULC, the value of exports will increase 
by 1%. An elasticity equal to negative one implies that a 1% increase in ULC will result in a 1% decrease 





Table 4.5 below presents the estimated ULC point-elasticity of global export share for 
each product category, with all estimated elasticities significant at either 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
These elasticities represent the sample average elasticity among the comparator countries over 
the 15-year period reviewed (2000 and 2015). Unsurprisingly, Table 4.5 also suggests a 
negative relationship between ULC and the share of global exports for all product categories, 
such that a reduction in ULC across the sample countries is associated with an average increase 
in the share of global exports. For the textiles, clothing and footwear product categories, a 1% 
average decrease in ULC is associated with a 0.18%, 0.19% and 0.21% improvement on 
average in the share of global exports. Similar results are estimated for the rubber, plastics, 
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consumer electronics and furniture product categories, albeit to a lesser degree. A 1% average 
decrease in ULC for the rubber, plastics, consumer electronics and furniture product categories 
is associated with a 0.14%, 0.06%, 0.20% and 0.29% average improvement in a country’s 
export share respectively. 
The results estimated in Table 4.4 and 4.5 are consistent with those cited in De Broeck 
et al. (2012), where the authors note that countries which have demonstrated improvements in 
(or declining) ULC relative to an international norm are those that have increased their 
respective share of global exports the most. The implications of these results for South Africa 
are significant given the country’s continued intention to embark on an export-intensive growth 
strategy. Given South Africa’s lack of relative ULC competitiveness, if such a strategy is to be 
supported by growth in labour-intensive exports, such that employment is a direct outcome of 
export-intensive growth, then it follows that ULC would be an important consideration for 
policy makers. 
4.4  Discussion and Conclusion  
The evidence presented in this section suggests that while wages are an important determinant 
of labour cost competitiveness, LP is an equally important consideration when seeking to 
understand relative cost competitiveness of labour across countries. The results in Section 4.2 
suggest that in 2015, ULC in South African labour-intensive production were relatively less 
competitive than the sample average (with the exception of ULC in furniture production). 
Given the negative relationship between ULC and export performance, as demonstrated by the 
point-elasticity estimates in Section 4.3, one can suggest that relatively uncompetitive ULC in 
labour-intensive manufacturing have contributed to the lack of export growth in these 
industries, as well as the rapid growth in import penetration ratios for these products (see 





Therefore, the common notion that lower wages alone will improve the competitiveness 
of South African labour-intensive production is an oversimplification of the problem. 
Countries that face similar macroeconomic conditions to South Africa such as Turkey, have 
been able to improve the relative competitiveness of ULC despite employers being burdened 
by relatively higher per employee LC than employers in South Africa (see Table 4.2 and 4.3). 
This has been achieved through improvements in relative LP rather than reductions in relative 
LC. Consequently, while maintaining wages at competitive levels going forward is likely to 
remain an important feature of industrial policy decisions aimed at improving growth and 
export prospects in employment generating industries, it’s likely that South Africa’s 
competitive edge will have to be derived through improvements in relative productivity levels 
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0.15 
(0.17) 
Table 4.5 ULC Elasticity of Global Export Share for Selected Product Categories 
Note: 
• The dependent variable is the log of real exports.  
• Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated elaticities. 
• ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Source: UNIDO Indastat Database.  







SECTION 5 - Conclusions and Policy Recommendations: Is there a Role 
for Special Economic Zones? 
 
5.1 Introductory Discussion 
The evidence presented in the preceding sections of this paper has highlighted how South 
Africa’s industrial development has followed a path of capital and energy dependence, in 
defiance of its endowment of abundant labour. This growth in capital and energy-intensive 
production and exports in South Africa is evidence of the fact that purposeful and strategic 
policy support can effectively develop a competitive advantage in industries. However, as 
noted by Justin Lin in Lin and Chang (2009:5), the cost of achieving a competitive advantage 
will likely be greater when this development defies a country’s natural comparative advantage. 
Thus, if the purpose of industrial policy is to facilitate structural change in a way that ensures 
the most efficient use of a country’s resources, then targeting high-skilled, capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries in South Africa, despite a surplus of low-skilled labour, is implicitly 
cost-ineffective and purpose-defying. 
In principle, formal policy as an institution under the direct authoritative supervision of 
the State can effect immediate change in society. However, these formal institutions are deeply 
intertwined with the informal institutions that reflect the prevailing political, social and 
economic interests within that society and consequently, formal policy change is never a 
smooth process, but rather sticky and path dependent, with policy outcomes reflecting a 
compromise between various role players in the economy. (Aggarwal, 2017:11).  
It follows therefore that South Africa’s capital and skill-intensive path dependence 
cannot simply be altered by means of policies that favour labour-intensive growth over the 
current development trajectory, despite this trajectory impeding broader developmental 
objectives such as large-scale job-creation. Special Economic Zones (SEZ), if implemented 
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effectively, provide a policy tool to address these institutional inefficiencies, enabling policy 
implementation that is more aligned to the developmental goals in an economy (Aggarwal, 
2012:1). In this sense they provide a potential solution to create an environment that removes 
the impediments to the broader development objectives of a particular country (The World 
Investment Report, 2019:131; Aggarwal, 2017:12). 
With the above in mind, this section explores the practical foundations of SEZ’s as the 
cornerstone of an industrial policy approach that explicitly supports investment and growth in 
manufacturing industries that offer the greatest potential for job-creation. The arguement for a 
labour-intensive manufacturing SEZ in South Africa is derived from recommendations 
published in the Centre for Development and Enterprise’s (CDE) seven-part series entitled 
“The Growth Agenda”. The practical foundations of the CDE’s proposal suggest the 
establishment of a labour-intensive export processing zone (EPZ) in Nelson Mandela Bay, with 
all production inside the zone destined for the export market (Kaplan 2016:5). Kaplan argues 
that the single greatest impediment to labour-intensive growth in South Africa is the relatively 
high bargaining council mandated minimum wages firms are forced to pay (Kaplan 2016:2-5). 
As such, the main incentive proposed to attract investment into the zone is the elimination of 
various labour regulations governing firms operating inside the zone, allowing free market 
forces to determine the equilibrium wage paid to employees, rather than being obligated to pay 
mandated minimum wages. 
  Drawing on Kaplan’s EPZ proposal as a basis, and on the principal that an SEZ in some 
form may provide an effective solution to stimulate investment and growth in labour-intensive 
industries, the remainder of this paper argues a broader strategic approach, whereby lower 




Such an approach would seek to develop a sustainable competitive advantage in labour-
intensive manufacturing, utilizing the country’s endowment of low-skilled labour, and 
generating the positive externalities associated with improved employment outcomes. To this 
end, the remainder of this section is set out as follows: Section 5.2 examines the utilization of 
SEZs as drivers of job-creation, reflecting on South Africa’s current SEZ policy in the process; 
Section 5.3 presents the arguments for a labour-intensive SEZ policy in South Africa and 
Section 5.4 grounds the argument by presenting a practical example that examines the financial 
implications of such an approach, utilizing the clothing industry as a case study.  
 
5.2 SEZs as Drivers of Job-creation 
Simplistically, SEZs are defined as legally and geographically designated areas in which some 
combination of infrastructural, fiscal or regulatory incentives are offered to firms operating 
within the designated jurisdiction (Centre for Development and Enterprise [CDE], 2012; 
Saggers, 2015:8). SEZs have traditionally been established as economic enclaves, legally 
segmented from the broader economy as a means of overcoming various regulatory and 
institutional impediments preventing certain developmental objectives (Aggarwal, 2017:10; 
World Investment Report, 2019:128). In this regard, SEZs have been deployed around the 
world to achieve a variety of differing objectives, including but not limited to trade promotion, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), industrial development and job-creation (Aggarwal, 2017:2-
3; Asian Development Bank, 2015:68; World Investment Report, 2019:128-129).  
Numerous successes, most notably in Asia, demonstrate the potential for effective SEZ 
programmes to catalyze economic development and generate large-scale employment, both 
inside the SEZs themselves, as well as in the broader economy. For example, SEZs in Vietnam 
are credited with the creation of over 1 million direct and indirect jobs in the first 15 years of 
operation; Bangladesh’s SEZ programme is said to have created over 300 thousand jobs since 
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1983; and SEZs in China are said to have generated roughly 40 million direct jobs since their 
inception (Asian Development Bank, 2015:67-69; Farole and Sharpe, 2017:15).  
In terms of employment, South Africa’s SEZs have been expensive and underwhelming. Table 
5.1 below details the employment outcomes in two of South Africa’s largest and oldest SEZs, 
namely Coega IDZ (CIDZ) and East London IDZ (ELIDZ). Between 2001 and 2015, CIDZ 
attracted a total of R11.6-billion
15
 in private sector investment, with only 6860 permanent jobs 
generated over the same time. This equates to approximately R1.7 million in investment per 
permanent job created. Similarly, between 2001 and 2015, ELIDZ received R2.5 billion in 
investment and generated 3048 direct jobs, equating to a R820 210 investment for every 
permanent job created. Table 5.1 further highlights that job-creation in the zones is also skill-
intensive, with only 34% of permanent jobs in CIDZ classified as either low or semi-skilled, 
with this figure marginally higher at 36% in ELIDZ. This equates to roughly R5million 
investment per low/semi-skilled job created at CIDZ and R2.3million investment at ELIDZ. 
The outcomes highlighted in Table 5.1 can be explained in part by the dominant production 
activities occurring inside the SEZs, detailed in Table 5.2. With the exception of agro-
processing which is relatively labour-intensive, the primary manufacturing activities occurring 
inside of South Africa’s SEZs include chemical, metals and motor vehicle production, all of 
which are capital and skills-intensive. 
As highlighted by Kaplan (2016:1-4), South Africa has not had an SEZ where job-
creation is the central focus but instead SEZ policy has focused on developing higher value-
adding and skill-intensive activities, much in line with the development objectives spelt out in 
other central policy documents (Farole and Sharpe, 2017:15; Kaplan, (2016:7).  
 









Consequently, the rationale and critical success factors for South Africa’s SEZ programme are 
not conducive to large-scale job-creation because the overriding objective of the policy is 
focused on supporting rather than altering the current development trajectory. Simply put, the 
SEZ programme in its current form is not likely to overcome the impediments preventing South 
Africa from moving to a more labour-intensive growth path.  
 
5.3 The Arguments for A Labour-Intensive SEZ Policy in South Africa 
As noted by Aggarwal (2017:14), the primary objective of an SEZ policy should be to 
overcome the sticky and path dependent institutional impediments that inhibit desired 
developmental outcomes from occurring organically in the broader economy. However, there 
is no blueprint of a successful SEZ (Aggarwal, 2013:13). Parallel to the successes described 
previously, exist a plethora of SEZ programmes around the world that remain significantly 
under-utilized, with limited investment and job-creation (Aggarwal, 2017:2; Asian 
Development Bank, 2015:67-69; Mukherjee, Pal, Deb, Ray, Goyal [Mukherjee et al], 2016:34-
40; World Investment Report, 2019:129). Despite the fact that their impact on development 
outcomes remains highly contentious given the mixed results and experiences between 
countries (Aggarwal, 2017:2; World Investment Report, 2019:129), evidence suggests that 
there are key elements that are essential to long-term sustainability and success namely, 
strategic focus, regulatory framework and value to investors (World Investment Report, 
2019:131). With, these considerations in mind, the following section presents the argument for 






5.3.1  SEZ Infrastructure is Already Developed  
In cases where SEZs are designed to promote trade and access to global markets, upfront costs 
are often associated with large-scale investments in trade infrastructure such as seaports or 
airports. This was no different with SEZ implementation in South Africa, with the DTI 
expending R3.3 billion and R1.1 billion on infrastructural development and upgrading at CIDZ 
and ELIDZ respectively between 2001 and 2010 (Chinguno, 2011; Scheepers, 2012:34). Thus, 
perhaps the most tangible advantage to using SEZs to promote large-scale job-creation in South 
Africa, is that the infrastructure required to establish the policy already exists. Furthermore, 
current investment and activity in South Africa’s SEZs remains underwhelming and much of 
the developed infrastructure is significantly underutilized (Kaplan, 2016:4; DTI, 2012; 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group [PMG], 2013; Chinguno, 2011). This has been particularly 
evident in the case of the CIDZ, where the R11 billion, 60-hectare deep-water port and 
container terminal, Ngqura, still only utilizes roughly 25%, and the nearby Port Elizabeth 
harbour only 56% of capacity respectively. (Ports Regulator of South Africa, 2016:7). Whereas 
the establishment of an SEZ policy from scratch would require significant upfront cost and 
bear considerably higher risk of failure, the establishment of an SEZ for labour-intensive 
manufacturing needn’t incur the same burden (Kaplan, 2016:4). Current surplus infrastructural 
capacity would merely require reallocation to accommodate the needs of the newly established 
labour-intensive SEZ.  
 
5.3.2  Strategically Focused Industry Targeting 
If rapid job-creation is seen as a pressing strategic development objective, then SEZ’s can be 
used not just as an investment promotion tool but as a strategic industrial policy tool designed 
to explicitly target and support labour-intensive manufacturing industries (PMG, 2013). 
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Numerous global experiences predicate that successful SEZ design and implementation occurs 
with specific industrial activities and value chain components in mind, with these activities 
well aligned to strategic development objectives in the host country (Aggarwal, 2017:16; Asian 
Development Bank, 2015:130-131; Farole and Sharpe, 2017:12). Through industry targeting, 
SEZ design and implementation can more effectively provide for, and promote the required 
factors of production, skills development, supply chain linkages and SEZ incentives most likely 
to create a source of competitive advantage to SEZ firms (World Investment Report, 
2019:130).  
Latecomer countries to SEZ implementation, most notably in less developed economies, 
have used SEZs primarily as investment promotion tools rather than strategic industrial policy 
tools (World Investment Report, 2019:129). In this sense, a multi-activity approach has been 
adopted with minimal design and implementation effort in clustering or specializing. 
Consequently, the scope for knowledge spillovers, cost sharing, resource pooling, productivity 
gains and supply chain linkage development associated with industrial clustering and economic 
agglomeration is severely limited (Asian Development Bank, 2015:76; World Investment 
Report, 2019:130).  
Much in the same way, SEZs in South Africa have been used as investment promotion 
tools rather than a strategic industrial policy instrument to achieve developmental objectives 
aligned to a clear industrial strategy (PMG, 2013). For the most part South Africa’s current 
SEZ policy has had a broad industrial focus that makes vague distinctions between firms that 
are or aren’t eligible to invest in each SEZ. There were no feasibility studies conducted into 
the viability of SEZs for specific industries or value chains, nor was the private sector 
sufficiently consulted as to what the prevailing binding constraints were for specific industries 
(PMG, 2013). For example, current and potential investors surveyed cited skills shortages, the 
regulatory environment, trade services and electricity constraints as primary binding obstacles 
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to growth. Yet despite this, the current SEZ programme emphasizes infrastructure provision 
and fiscal incentives as the core SEZ offering, with no clarity on how either of these focuses 
address the constraints cited by potential investors (PMG, 2013; Farole and Sharpe, 2017:15).  
With the above in mind, there is significant scope for SEZs to be used as a strategic 
policy tool for rapid job-creation by establishing industry targeted SEZs that are designed and 
implemented to provide a competitive advantage to specific labour-intensive activities. For 
example, if the availability of skills is important to investors from the clothing and textiles 
industry, then a clothing and textile SEZ can make provisions to implement skills development 
programmes specific to the industry. At the same time, the provision of industry-specific SEZ 
offerings such as incentives, infrastructure and support services allows SEZ administrators a 
clearer strategic focus and mandate when marketing the SEZ offerings to firms, a factor which 
has been a considerable challenge of the current SEZ policy where no clear marketing strategy 
exists (Special Economic Zone Advisory Board [SEZAB], 2018:29).  
 
5.3.3  A Testbed for Supportive Labour-intensive Policy 
As discussed above, when informal institutions prevent the removal or altering of regulations 
in the economy that are binding constraints to the development of labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries, then SEZs may be an appropriate instrument through which policy 
can be experimentally implemented to remove these constraints. (Farole and Sharpe, 2017:15). 
For example, SEZs in China were used as laboratories for new policies designed to liberate the 
Chinese economy despite the broader economy remaining highly regulated and distorted. Only 
once policies were proven inside SEZs were they rolled out in the broader economy to emulate 
the pro-growth business environment achieved inside of the zones (Farole, 2011:196; Asian 
Development Bank, 2015:68).  
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In South Africa, the Youth Wage Subsidy (YWS) was, to an extent, an attempt to 
employ a similar strategy. The policy was proposed as a means of job creation and improving 
the cost-competitiveness of youth labour in South Africa, reducing the burden faced by 
employers in employing new low-earning individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 (Ebrahim, 
Leibbrandt and Ranchhod [Ebrahim et al, 2017:17-18). While on the face of it the policy 
seemed non-threatening and pro-labour growth, there were wide-spread concerns expressed by 
trade unions who suggested that the policy would cause displacement of existing labour and 
that consequently the impact of the policy from a job-creation perspective would be ambiguous 
(PMG, 2013). South Africa’s historical context has meant a deep distrust between unions and 
business, with prevailing labour market conditions in South Africa reflecting a political 
compromise between unions, business and government that often prevents meaningful labour 
reform (CDE, 2016:5; Natrrass, 2014:21-25). Although the merits for or against the YWS are 
beyond the scope of this paper, it’s likely that if the YWS had first been implemented 
successfully inside an industry-targeted SEZ framework, that there would be less room for 
speculation as to its effectiveness.  
 
5.4  A Labour-Intensive SEZ in South Africa – A Practical Example 
 
The discussion thus far has indicated that effectively implemented SEZs may provide a solution 
in overcoming various impediments to growth in labour-intensive manufacturing industries. 
Section 5.4 seeks to conceptualize this discussion using the example of a SEZ that targets South 
African clothing manufacturers to overcome various binding constraints to growth faced within 






5.4.1 Incentives Offered 
As noted by Aggarwal (2017: 4), there is no genetic list of success factors for a SEZ.  Incentives 
offered must be determined by the case-specific critical success factors of the policy, and the 
industry-specific binding constraints that the incentives are designed to overcome. The 
incentives offered in the practical example to follow are based on two broad considerations. 
Firstly, global incentives offered to firms in SEZs were investigated in order to establish which 
were most commonly applied
16
 and secondly, incentives were selected based on the theoretical 
and evidence-based constraints faced by clothing manufacturers in South Africa. 
• Corporate Tax Reduction: Perhaps the most commonly applied SEZ incentive globally 
is a reduction in corporate tax in some form or another. This incentive is purely a fiscal 
benefit to entice investors and offers no strategic significance to the broader SEZ policy 
being proposed in this section. A reduction in the corporate tax rate is applied to clothing 
manufacturers inside the SEZ, with the reduction based on the prevailing corporate tax 
rate of 28%.  
• Wage Subsidy: Wages in South African have risen faster than the improvements in 
labour productivity, adversely affecting the cost competitiveness of labour-intensive 
manufacturers. In industries such as clothing, where access to low-wage labour is often 
viewed as a competitive advantage, it is critical that relatively high wages be addressed 
in the short-term, allowing for labour-productivity to improve to the point that higher 
wages are justified in the future. Turkey provides a useful indication of this, where wages 
are almost twice those offered in South African clothing production, yet labour 
productivity is high enough to ensure that unit labour costs in Turkish clothing production 
 
16
 Incentives were examined in SEZs from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Philippines, Rep. of Korea, South 
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. Incentives are classified as either fiscal or non-fiscal benefits. The 
output from this exercise is documented in Table A1 in the appendix.  
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are more competitive than in South Africa. In the example to follow, a wage subsidy is 
applied to the bargaining council mandated minimum wage that firms inside the SEZ 
must be compelled to pay. SEZ firms pay employees the full mandated wage and receive 
the subsidy in the form of a rebate.  
• Training Grant: Utilizing a wage subsidy to reduce the cost burden faced by firms 
inside the SEZ can only be viewed as a short-term solution (ILO: 2016:4). Over time, it 
is critical that labour-productivity improves so that reductions in the wage subsidy are 
offset by improvements in labour-productivity. To encourage the improvement in labour-
productivity, a training grant is provided to SEZ firms, calculated as a percentage of their 
total wage bill.  
• Import Duty Reduction: Reductions in import duties on intermediate goods are 
commonly utilized incentives in SEZs around the world. In the clothing industry, fabric 
is the most significant cost associated with the construction of a garment, with fabric 
constituting between 60 – 70% of cost of sales (Guiding Metrics. 2019; 
Techpacker.2019; Fibre2Fashion. 2019; Stitchworld. 2019.). In South Africa, fabric 
production and finishing capacity and capabilities, are significantly underdeveloped. 
Consequently, local clothing manufacturers are forced to source a majority of fabric from 
abroad and subject to import duties of 22%, making it difficult for local producers to 
remain cost competitive (Export.gov:2019). To combat this, a reduction in import duties 
is applied to the prevailing tariff rate of 22%.  
• Local Content Incentive: As discussed earlier in this section, in order to develop 
broader developmental benefits from SEZs, it is critical that linkages to the rest of the 
economy are developed. When SEZs are targeted for specific industries, complementary 
policies to SEZs should aim to strengthen and expand relevant value chain components 
such that the SEZ is established as a growth pole for further development in the specific 
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value chain being targeted (World Investment Report. 2019:131). In the example to 
follow, complementary policies should focus on recapitalizing local textile production, 
such that the necessary capacity and capabilities are available to supply clothing 
manufacturers in the SEZ. At the same time, a local content incentive must be carefully 
implemented to coincide with a phasing out of the import duty reduction in order to 
induce a substitution effect from imported to local fabrics. A local content incentive is 
applied in this example as a percentage of total fabric sourced locally and is received in 
the form of a rebate.  
• Feasibility and Marketing Grant: As noted by the International Labour 
Organization(ILO) (2016:6), consumer trends – notably in clothing production – are 
increasingly requiring suppliers to produce with ethical practices including labour 
standards. Consequently, improvements in labour-productivity should be driven by 
efficiency gains and not greater work intensity or longer working hours (ILO, 2016:7). 
Instead, improvements in productivity must be driven by adopting better technologies 
and production processes. Thus, an effective SEZ for clothing manufacturers must ensure 
that its design facilitates this process. In this example, the feasibility and marketing grant 
is provided to subsidize feasibility studies into the purchase and use of the latest 
technologies available, fund global best-practice study tours to world-class 
manufacturing facilities, and to subsidize travel to, and the participation in, global trade 
shows for clothing and textile manufacturers. Effective marketing strategies for South 
African SEZ firms and for South African SEZs in general, is an area identified for 
significant improvement (Special Economic Zones Advisory Board [SEZAB], 2018:29). 





5.4.2 SEZ Costs and Benefits 
For the purposes of this analysis, the costs associated with the proposed SEZ for clothing 
manufacturers are categorized as either direct or indirect costs. Direct costs are tangible fiscal 
costs that are derived in the provision of SEZ incentives, including the wage subsidy, the 
training grant, local content incentive for local fabric purchases and the feasibility and 
marketing grant. Indirect costs are derived from the application of reduced tax rates in the sense 
that this constitutes forgone taxable income. Indirect costs are therefore incurred from forgone 
corporate tax income and forgone duties on imported fabric. Similarly, SEZ benefits are 
separated by direct and indirect benefits derived from the SEZ. Direct benefits include the 
employment generated by SEZ firms, corporate tax income (after accounting for the reduced 
corporate tax rate) and import duties (after accounting for the reduction in import tariffs). 
Indirect benefits include indirect jobs and taxable income generated from increased demand 
and production of local fabrics by South African textile manufacturers, as well as construction 
jobs required to produce new factories inside the SEZ.  
 
5.4.3 Analysis Assumptions and Applied Rates 
Table 5.3 below details the various analysis assumptions and applied rates utilized in the 
example, as well as a brief description of how assumption values were calculated and the 
sources where relevant variable data was sourced. In all cases, figures have been converted to 
2017 Rands for correctness in comparison. Each assumption and applied rate is described 
briefly below: 
• Number of employees: This denotes the average number of employees per clothing 
manufacturer in the UNIDO Indistat database. It is calculated by dividing the total 




• Monthly Wage Per Employee: The monthly wage per employee is taken from the 
bargaining council agreed minimum wage for clothing machinists as of September 2018. 
The agreement is applicable until the end of August 2024. The agreement differentiates 
between learner workers and qualified workers, allowing for lower rates paid to learners. 
Following 1.5 years of experience, a learner is classified as qualified and must be paid 
the appropriate rate for a qualified machinist. These nuances are accounted for in the 
practical example (Department of Labour, 2018:6).  
• Total Turnover: Total turnover is calculated by using the average turnover per rand of 
employee cost for the clothing industry between 2012 and 2017. The StatsSA Financial 
Statistics database provides data on aggregated industry-specific turnover and income 
(disaggregated by item), expenditure (disaggregated by expenditure item) and 
profitability values before tax. The average turnover generated per Rand of employee 
cost is multiplied by total employment cost of the example SEZ firm to arrive at an 
estimated turnover.  
• Fabric costs: Total fabric cost of sales is calculated using an assumed fabric cost of sales 
figure of 60% of total cost of sales.  
• Labour Productivity Improvements: Assumed labour productivity improvements are 
derived from two sources. First, the average gains in labour productivity as derived from 
the DTI’s Sectoral Economic Indicators dataset between 2012 and 2017. This is then 
applied to the low growth in labour productivity scenario to follow in the example below. 
A second labour productivity improvement is applied to a high labour productivity 
improvement scenario in the example to follow. This is calculated as the average labour 
productivity improvement achieved by countries in the upper quartile in the clothing 






Analysis Assumptions  
& Applied Rates 
Description Source 
Number of employees  
Average number of employees per clothing 
firm in Unido Indistat database 
UNIDO Indistat 
database 
Monthly wage per employee 
(R's) 
Agreed monthly wage as per SACTWU 
bargaining council agreement. Assumed that 
employees have zero experience when starting 
and are qualified machinists after 1.5 years. A 
learner rate is applied for the first 1.5 years and 
a qualified machinist rate is applied thereafter 
Department of 
Labour 
Annual wage per employee 
(R's) 
Monthly wage multiplied by 12 months Calculated 
Total annual wage bill (R's) 
Annual wage multiplied by the number of 
employees 
Calculated 
Total turnover (R's) 
Average turnover per Rand of employee cost 
for the clothing industry between 2012 - 2017 
Stats SA Annual 
Financial Statistics 
Dataset 
Fabric cost of sales (R's) 
Assumed at 60% based on a garment costing 





Total imported fabric (R's) 
Calculated by multiplying the import 
penetration ratio by total fabric cost of sales 
Calculated 
Assumed taxable corporate 
income 
Calculated from average EBITDA for clothing 
manufacturers between 2012 - 2017 
Calculated 
Turnover per unit of 
employee cost (R's) 
Turnover divided by wage bill Calculated 
Labour productivity 
improvement (% change) 
Scenario 1: Average LP improvement in SA 
clothing industry between 2012 - 2017. 
Scenario 2: Average LP improvement in top 10 
countries from the UNIDO Indistat database 
between 2012 - 2016 
DTI, UNIDO 
EBITDA excluding subsidies 
(% of turnover) 
Average EBITDA for clothing manufacturers 
between 2012 - 2017 
Stats SA Annual 
Financial Statistics 
Dataset 
Fabric import penetration 
ratio 
Total imported woven, knitted and crocheted 
fabrics divided by total consumption of woven, 
knitted and crocheted fabrics in 2016 
CottonSA 
Fabric cost of sales (% of 
turnover) 
Assumed % fabric cost of sales multiplied by 
annual turnover 
Calculated 
Local fabric cost of sales (% 
of total fabric cost of sales) 
1 minus import penetration ratio multiplied by 
total fabric cost of sales 
Calculated 
Import duty on fabric  Current import duty on fabric in South Africa SARS, DTI 
Corporate tax rate  Current corporate tax rate  SARS 
Table 5.3: Analysis Assumptions and Applied Rates in SEZ Practical Example
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•  EBITDA: EBITDA is derived from the StatsSA Financial Statistics dataset between 
2012 and 2017 for clothing manufacturing in South Africa. EBITDA is then used as a 
proxy for taxable income.  
• Import Penetration Ratio: The import penetration ratio is calculated by summing the 
total finished fabric production in South Africa and finished fabric imports, and dividing 
finished fabric imports by the summed amount (CottonSA, 2017:9; International Trade 
Centre, 2019).  
 
 
5.4.4  An SEZ for Clothing Manufacturers in South Africa 
Table 5.4 below details the estimated costs and benefits associated with a labour-intensive SEZ 
specifically for clothing manufacturers. The example uses two scenarios over a ten-year period 
to illustrate the different estimated impacts from an SEZ policy that doesn’t actively utilize the 
SEZ as a growth hub for the broader economy (Scenario 1) and an SEZ that is utilized to 
stimulate growth in the economy through linkage development (Scenario 2), in line with 
international best-practice as discussed in the sub-sections above. In both scenarios, the 
example expresses all costs and benefits associated with a single firm that choses to open a 
clothing factory inside the SEZ. It is important to note that the size and form of the various 
incentives deployed in the examples to follow are used merely as an illustrative example, rather 
than a hard and fast recommendation on the form that these incentives should take. The size 
and form of incentives can therefore be altered to form a variety of policy combinations 








5.4.4.1 Scenario Comparisons  
Critical Success Factors (CSFs)  
 
The CSFs are different for both scenarios. In Scenario 1 the CSFs are to encourage investment 
in clothing manufacturing inside the zone and in doing so, create direct employment of low 
and semi-skilled labour. Consequently, various incentives are applied in accordance with this 
purpose. In Scenario 2, the CSFs also seek to encourage investment and direct employment in 
the SEZ but this is not the sole CSF. In this case, another CSF is the development of strategic 
value chain linkages as a means of generating SEZ derived benefits for the rest of the economy. 
Consequently, the incentives and policies applied in the SEZ will differ when compared to 
Scenario 1 in that they are designed to meet this objective.   
 
Reduced Wage Cost 
In both scenarios simulated, for the first 3 years that the hypothetical firm is located in 
the SEZ, a wage subsidy of 50% is applied. This allows the firm to still pay the Bargaining 
Council compliant (BCC) minimum wage for the clothing industry, such that the annual wage 
of a worker is equal to R47,652. However, the cost to the firm is only R23,826 when accounting 
for the subsidy. In 2015 US dollar terms, this is the equivalent of $145 per month which is 
lower than the minimum monthly wage paid in clothing industries in China ($155), Philippines 
($150), Malaysia ($225) and Thailand ($237) (ILO, 2016:4)
17
. Every three years, the wage 
subsidy is reduced by 10% based on the assumption that an ongoing wage subsidy is not 
sustainable and that worker productivity levels will improve over time such that the impact of 
rising wage costs on unit labour costs will be mitigated to some extent. In both scenarios, in its 
 
17 Exchange rate and consumer price index (CPI) data for the USA and South Africa are sourced from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.  
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entirety over the 10-year period a wage subsidy for 682 employees, who receive the BCC 
minimum wage, would cost R16.2 million per year for the first 3 years, R14.5 million in the 
second 3 years, and R11.6 million in the final 3 years (2017 Rands).  
 
Reduced Fabric Cost and Local Content Incentives 
In both scenarios, the cost of imported fabric is reduced by applying a 100% reduction 
in the 22% import tariff for the first 3 years the hypothetical firm is operational inside the SEZ. 
For the Scenario 1 firm, the 100% tariff reduction is applied for the whole 10-year period, as 
no local content incentive is offered because encouraging local sourcing is not a strategic 
priority for SEZ success. However, in Scenario 2 because a key objective is to stimulate 
linkages in the rest of the economy, the reduced tariff incentive is phased out over time, 
coinciding with an increased local content incentive over time. In doing so, it is assumed that 
SEZ firms will be encouraged to substitute imported fabric for local fabric, stimulating demand 
in the local economy. As a result of this increased demand for local fabrics, indirect job-
creation potential is enhanced. However, this will not happen unless policies complimentary to 
the SEZ policy seek to develop local fabric production and finishing capabilities in the local 
textiles industry. In this case, the SEZ policy will only form part of a broader strategic industrial 
policy approach that seeks to develop the clothing manufacturing value chain rather than a 
simple investment promotion tool. In Scenario 1, the cost of the reduced tariff on imported 
fabric over the course of 10 years is estimated to be R16 million per year for the first 3 years, 
R18.7 million for the second 3 years and R20.7 million per year for the final 3 years (2017 
Rands) in forgone import duties for the State, while in Scenario 2 the estimated cost of the 
reduced tariff on imported fabric, as well as the local content incentive over the first 3 years is 
estimated at R19 million per year for the first 3 years, R11.4 million for the second 3 years, 




Labour Productivity Improvements 
Because a wage subsidy is not sustainable in perpetuity, there must be another means by 
which unit labour costs are maintained. Implicitly, labour productivity improvements become 
a critical factor in ensuring that SEZ firms remain in situ after a wage subsidy is phased out 
over time. As noted by the International Labour Organization (2016:9), more non-wage factors 
are driving purchasing and sourcing decisions of large European and North America apparel 
retailers as consumers become ever more aware of where products come from and the 
environment in which they were produced. Among these are ethical working conditions and 
remuneration policies of clothing manufacturers. Consequently, in order to keep unit labour 
costs low via rapid labour productivity improvements, an SEZ environment that offers firms a 
means of improving skills and production processes, as well as a mechanism to be exposed to 
and disseminate new technology, is likely to be a source of attraction as it offers a meaningful 
way of improving productivity levels of labour. Moreover, this offers the greatest opportunity 
for firms to move up the value chain into higher value-added products and support services 
(ILO, 2019:8).  
In Scenario 1, the SEZ is designed to reduce the cost for SEZ firms as much as possible 
by means of incentives. Consequently, in this scenario it is assumed that there is no concerted 
effort to encourage value chain upgrading and skills development. Consequently, 
improvements in labour productivity are kept constant at 4.31% p.a, the average rate of labour 
productivity improvement in the South African clothing industry between 2012 and 2017, 
while the training grant offered to investors is the equivalent of 0.38% of the total wage bill, 
which is the average in the South African clothing industry between 2012 and 2017.  
In contrast, Scenario 2 is designed to enhance the long-term development of the local 
clothing value chain. Consequently, a training grant is designed that will provide a training 
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allowance approximately 5 times the current average clothing manufacturer’s training spend in 
South Africa. Thus, a training grant of 1.5% of total wage bill is provided to SEZ firms. An 
emphasis on training and upskilling of labour provides a useful opportunity to engage private 
sector training firms to provide the specific training required by SEZ firms such as TVET 
Colleges South Africa, who offer specialized training for machinists in the clothing industry 
(TVET, 2019). As a result of the emphasis on improving labour productivity, a labour 
productivity improvement of 15% is assumed for Scenario 2, in line with productivity gains 
of upper quartile clothing manufacturing countries (UNIDO, 2019).  
 
Incentives and The Cost of Job Creation  
The total net cost per firm over the course of the full 10-year period in Scenario 1 is 
estimated to be R306.4 million (2017 Rands), averaging R30.6 million per year. This equates 
to R332 836 over ten years per direct and indirect job created per firm, with a total of 682 direct 
manufacturing jobs created, 115 indirect textile manufacturing jobs created and 239 
construction jobs created per firm
18
. In Scenario 2, the cost total net cost per firm over the 10-
year period is R352.7 million (2017 Rands), averaging R35.2 million per year. Since this 
scenario is expected to generate larger employment multiplier effects in the broader economy, 
this equates to an estimated R275 669 per job created, with 682 direct manufacturing jobs 
created, 359 indirect textile manufacturing jobs created and 259 construction jobs created. 
As is the case with any policy decision, it is critical to trade-off the costs and benefits of 
various policy options against each other. Table 5.5 below details total cost of incentives 
provided to the various provincial SEZ programmes in South Africa as detailed in the 
2017/2018 Annual National Incentives Report (ANIR) (DTI, 2018:58). The report indicates  
 
18
 Construction jobs are calculated based on the ratio of construction jobs created per firm invested in South 




that in the 2018 financial year, the value of incentives paid to various provincial SEZ 
programmes varied greatly, with the Eastern Cape receiving the highest value of incentives and 
grants at R731 million, while the Limpopo only received R10 million. Most significant 
however, is that in all cases except the Free State, the cost of the incentives per estimated job 
created is higher than in the either of the two scenarios reviewed in this paper.  
The ANIR also details the incentives and subsidies paid out to various manufacturing 
industries. Table 5.6 below indicates the value of incentives paid to the motor vehicles, 
chemicals, and clothing and textiles manufacturing industries. Given the size of the motor 
vehicles and chemicals industries in South Africa relative to clothing and textiles, it’s not 
surprising that the value of incentives paid out is significantly larger for the former two 
industries relative to the latter. However, when investigating the cost per job created, it’s clear 
that the employment returns from incentives paid to the clothing and textiles industries are 
significantly more attractive cost-effective when compared to motor vehicles and chemicals. 
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The cost of incentive per estimated job created in clothing and textiles is R152,542, compared 
to R1.5 million for motor vehicles and R996,016 for chemicals. 
 
5.5  Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
The practical scenarios provided in this section provide an indication of how SEZs can 
be utilized, not merely as investment promotion tools, but as strategic policy instruments that 
form part of a concerted policy approach targeting industries that offer the greatest job-creation 
potential. Latecomer countries to SEZ implementation have tended to utilize SEZs as a quick-
fix solution for rapid investment and job-creation (World Investment Report, 2019:131). 
However, international experience suggests that SEZs can play a far more meaningful role in 
broader economic development, if the right supporting polices are utilized to generate value 
chain linkages with firms in the broader economy (Farole and Sharpe, 2017:12).  
However, as noted by Kaplan (2016:4), any SEZ policy must be carefully considered to 
prevent firms in the domestic economy from simply relocating to an SEZ in order to benefit 
from the incentives offered. One option would be to allow only new investments access to the 
SEZ. However, this option would likely create distortions in the domestic economy, whereby 
firms operating inside the zone would have a competitive advantage over competing firms in 
the broader economy. Another option would be to provide similar support to firms operating 
outside of the SEZ that are part of the same value chain, using the SEZ merely as a growth pole 
for broader value chain development. To this end beyond the attractive fiscal incentives, the 
    
Manufacturing 
Industry 
Cost of Incentive 
Projected Jobs 
Created 
Cost Per Job  
Created 
Motor Vehicles R2.7 billion 1736 R 1 555 300 
Chemical Products R1.5 billion 1506 R 996 016 
Clothing and Textiles R144 million 944 R 152 542 
 
 
Source: DTI 2018. 
Table 5.6 Incentives Paid to the Motor Vehicles, Chemicals and Clothing Textiles 
                 Industries in Financial Year 2018 
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SEZ would need to provide large investors with access to world-class infrastructure and trade 
facilities, tailored support service offerings and dedicated assistance in terms of customs, 
training, industry analysis and research, marketing and trade facilitation services such as trade 
shows. Beyond the SEZ, if supporting industrial policy could effectively develop suppliers to 
SEZ firms, then strategic supply chain linkages in close proximity would provide further 
advantages to investors assessing the viability of investing inside of the SEZ.  
The data presented Table 5.6 clearly indicates that the cost of incentives, with particular 
reference to job creation, is significantly lower in the labour-intensive clothing and textiles 
industry than in the motor vehicles and chemicals sectors. Table 5.4, utilizing the clothing and 
textiles industry as an example, demonstrates how an SEZ can provide the catalyst required for 
rapid investment and growth in a specifically designated area (Scenario 1). Scenario 2 
demonstrates that further to a designated SEZ, complimentary policies in the broader economy, 
provide a more strategic approach to large-scale employment. This kind of strategic value chain 
support would not be new to South African policy makers. As previously discussed, significant 
strategic State support has been offered throughout the automotive value chain since the launch 
of the MIDP in 1995 and the introduction of various other programs thereafter (DTI, 2018). 
On the back of this support, motor vehicle production and associated value chain components 
have grown significantly (see industry analysis in previous sections). If government had the 
same conviction for rapid job-creation for low-skilled labour in South Africa, then supporting 
labour-intensive industries in the same way, using a labour-intensive SEZ as the catalyst, may 







The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the comparative advantage for South African 
manufacturing lies, somewhat paradoxically, in capital-intensive production, strongly 
contrasting manufacturing industries in other developing countries of similar macroeconomic 
dispositions. However, this advantage has not developed organically, but has been shaped over 
time by industrial policy that has consistently incentivized investment in capital, energy and 
resource-intensive industries encompassing the countries MEC. Pre-1994, policy strategy was 
certainly one of capital deepening, with growth in aggregate manufacturing output driven 
almost exclusively by large-scale investment in capital, while net manufacturing employment 
was in decline by as early as 1979. This outcome, in the context of an abundant supply of low-
skilled labour, indicates that not only was policy distortive but it was comparative advantage 
defying as well. While central industrial policy post-1994 has consistently stated employment 
creation as a central objective, evidence suggests that a majority of support is still weighted 
heavily in manufacturing industries that are both capital and skill-intensive.  Thus, while policy 
has to some extent managed to develop manufacturing industries outside of the MEC – such 
as the rapid expansion in motor vehicle production – this development has not resulted in any 
meaningful job-creation.  
While policy has undoubtedly played a role in developing a comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive production, a lack of labour cost competitiveness has also contributed. Real 
wage increases in South African labour-intensive manufacturing industries have outstripped 
gains in labour productivity resulting in consistently rising unit labour costs relative to foreign 
competitors. Coupled with rapid trade liberalization post-1994, local labour-intensive firms 
were consequently faced with a deluge of imports from low cost foreign competitors resulting 
in stagnating and even negative growth in industries that have traditionally offered the greatest 
potential for job-creation.  
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  If combatting persistently high unemployment remains the critical fundamental 
challenge in South Africa, then the evidence presented in this paper indicates that in order for 
the manufacturing sector to play a meaningful role in this regard, there must be growth in 
industries that have the potential to absorb surplus low-skilled labour in the economy. Growth 
in industries that have traditionally formed the foundations of South Africa’s industrial capacity 
has proven to be insufficient and incapable of providing the large-scale job-creation required 
to meaningfully combat unemployment.  
Notwithstanding this fact, the evolution of South Africa’s manufacturing sector 
suggests that strategic and purposeful industrial policy has the potential to leverage available 
factors of production to develop globally competitive industries. In this sense, there is a strong 
suggestion that if similar policy impetus were to incentivize investment in labour-intensive 
industries, then similar outcomes can develop. Beyond the obvious positive socio-economic 
externalities associated with improved employment outcomes, the economy-wide efficiency 
gains associated with absorbing currently unproductive labour in productive manufacturing 
activities are likely to be significant relative to the cost of support required from the State. 
Therefore, an industrial policy strategy that emphatically targets growth in labour-intensive 
industries makes not only socio-economic sense but there is a strong economic case as well. 
This is not to say that policy support should be entirely reallocated from capital to labour-
intensive industries, but rather that similar support in labour-intensive industries has significant 
socio-economic and productive upside potential.  
Bearing in mind various institutional factors (formal and informal) and cost 
implications that would have to be considered in implementing a policy approach targeted 
exclusively at manufacturing industries with high job-creation potential, this paper suggests 
SEZs as a policy tool that might form the cornerstone of such an approach. SEZs have often 
been implemented as enclaves from the broader host economy to overcome various 
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impediments to achieving broader economic development outcomes. As indicated by Scenario 
1 in the practical SEZ example, a SEZ approach is certainly a cost-effective option for South 
Africa, as the cost per job created is likely to be far less than other policies implemented 
elsewhere in the economy. However, the enclave nature of many SEZs around the world, and 
indeed in the design element of Scenario 1, that has often prevented SEZ associated benefits 
from being accrued elsewhere in the economy and has thus limited its impact as a driver of 
sustainable structural change. Thus, the recommended option is that SEZs be used as a value 
chain growth-pole, whereby investment in the SEZs catalyzes multiplier effects throughout the 
local value chain, as was exemplified by Scenario 2 in the practical SEZ example. This, 
combined with strategic support to various value chain components elsewhere in the economy, 
offers significant upside potential from an employment perspective at a cost that is more than 
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